1 апреля в 18:00 Александр Нестеров (СПб ВШЭ) представит доклад "Measuring Manipulations In Matching Markets By Counting Manipulating Agents". Мероприятие состоится в рамках Городского экономического семинара. Доклад будет прочитан на английском языке.
Аннотация:
Due to various objectives and constraints, many real life matching markets are vulnerable to preference and capacity misreports. A large amount of such “manipulations” poses a serious threat to the success of these markets. To address this issue, numerous matching systems have recently reformed their matching rules. Examples include the entry-level medical labor market in the US, school admissions systems in New York City, Chicago, Denver, Ghana and England. We use a simple method of counting the number of all relevant manipulating agents and show that these reforms reduced the amount of manipulations.
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Фото: Unsplash