15 апреля в 18:00 состоится очередное заседание Городского экономического семинара. Фёдор Сандомирский прочитает доклад “Feasible Joint Posterior Beliefs”.
Аннотация доклада:
We study the set of possible joint posterior belief distributions of a group of agents who share a common prior regarding a binary state, and who observe some information structure. For two agents we introduce a quantitative version of Aumann’s Agreement Theorem, and show that it is equivalent to a characterization of feasible distributions due to Dawid et al. (1995). For any number of agents, we characterize feasible distributions in terms of a “no-trade” condition. We use these characterizations to study information structures with independent posteriors. We also study persuasion problems with multiple receivers, exploring the extreme feasible distributions.
Доклад пройдет на английском языке.
Для записи на семинар следует отправить запрос на электронный адрес spb.economic.seminar@gmail.com
Фото: Unsplash