Alexander Knysh gave a presentation as part of the Oriental Seminar in the EUSP’s Gold Hall. Mr. Knysh is the head of the Laboratory for Analysis and Modeling of Social Processes at SPbSU, and professor of Islamic Studies in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at the University of Michigan.
In the 21st century, Islam has become a powerful ideological tool used by various opposition groups and religious-political movements that support the status quo. This factor has determined the tremendous diversity in interpretations of Islam, spanning from “liberal Islam”, promoted by so-called “progressive Muslims” in the United States and Europe, and ending with the ideas of “global jihad.” The “Caucasus variant” of the latter is the primary topic of Knysh’s research, which aims to understand what motivates adherents to this ideology in the Northern Caucasus and explains its popularity among certain parts of the local Muslim population.
On October 31, 2007, Dokka Umarov announced the abolition of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, while simultaneously proclaiming himself as the head, or “Emir,” of a new military-political entity called the “Caucasus Emirate.” The creation of a new state was accompanied by the declaration of a new state doctrine, according to which all of humanity was divided into different categories based on their relationship to “true Islam.” Representatives of “true Islam” are known as “mujahedeen;” they are opposed by “infidels” (kuffar). So-called “hypocrites” (munafiqun) occupy an intermediary position between these two groups. The classification system proposed by Dokka Umarov’s is accompanied by his complete negation of the geographical and political categories taken from the “infidels.” Instead of Muslim republics in the North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, Umarov and other Caucasus Emirate leaders intended to create an international (and supranational) Islamic state in the region, which would become part of a worldwide caliphate.
“Islam is the world’s religion—but only when it has power.” With these words, Movladi Udugov, the Caucasus Emirate’s chief ideologue, concluded his own political manifesto. The declaration of the Emirate and its doctrine was followed by concrete military and political actions and statements, which are known to the majority of Russians through the media. After Umarov’s death in 2013, he was replaced by Ali Abu Makhammad ad-Dagistani. As for the secular wing of the movement for the Chechnya independence (the Republic of Ichkeria), its secular and pro-Western leaders lost their positions and found themselves in the role of “generals without an army.” This has resulted in a dramatic change in the style of leadership and ideological support for the new military-political formations in the North Caucasus, which exists on a primarily virtual level.
The Caucasus Emirate had two main ideologues: the late Akhmad Sardali, and Movladi Udugov. These men are the progenitors of the Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood” ideologue Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) and the Indo-Pakistani thinker Abul Ala Maududi (died 1979), who argued that the whole world is divided into the realm of pre-Islamic “ignorance” (jahiliyyah), which threatens to subjugate the entire world, and small enclaves of “true Islam,” whose representatives are loyal to the sovereignty of the “divine word” (hakimiyya).
The Arabic language plays an important role in the Caucasus Emirate’s ideology, and many participants and movements want to make it the official national language of its virtual constitution. In addition to legitimizing the insurgent movement, the Arabic language is imbued with sacred significance. When surrounded by federal troops, mujahedeen pronounce Arabic formulas in the last moments of life related to devotion and belief in all-powerful God. They firmly believe that these Arabic phrases open the gates to paradise.
The ideologues of the Caucasus Emirate oppose the Chechen, Dagestani and Circassian (Adyghe) nationalists, talking about the need to unite Muslims of the Caucasus on religious rather than national grounds.
Referring to the work of V. O. Bobrikov, Knysh noted the dependence of Emirate leaders’ ideological receptions on Soviet propaganda. He considers the reason for this to be the Soviet past of an organization of ideologues, which continues to determine the choice of artistic methods and aesthetics for communicating ideas to an audience.
In discussing reasons for the rise of insurgent movements in the region under the banner of Islam, Knysh pointed to the dominance of power groups (clans) that carry out informal control of local business and the financial flows from the federal government. Corruption and lawlessness beget discontent. In turn, the mujahedeen, having lost financial support from abroad, are forced to engage in racketeering and extortion, imposing taxes on Caucasian businessmen and corrupt officials. In recent months there has been a notable decrease in the number of young people ready to “leave for jihad” in the mountains. If, in the first years of its existence, the Emirate’s leaders argued that they simply did not have time to train mujahedeen, today their forums are full of complaints against the Caucasian people who do not wish to lead a “holy war” against “infidels” and their local “lackeys.”
In his conclusion, Knysh pointed out that the emergence of the Caucasian Emirate and similar jihadist organizations is a consequence of the uncertainty of real problems facing the societies in which they exist. In addition, one shouldn’t underestimate the attractiveness of the idea of “global jihad” for youth in search of heroism and grandiose goals that are, in this case, sanctified by the authority of God and his prophet Muhammad. For Movladi Udugov and his brethren, contributing to the development of the jihadist doctrine in the Caucasus and the Caucasus Emirate as a platform for its practical implementation serves as an ideological weapon. If we approach the Caucasus Emirate from an historical point of view, then its use by leaders of Islam and Sharia for uniting local Muslims can be traced back to the mountain “imams” Shamil (1832-1859) and Uzun Haji (1919-1920).
Gennady Yakovlev
