On May 29, Federico Romero, dean of the Department of History and Civilizations at the European University Institute in Florence, gave a lecture on new approaches to Cold War history.
Federico Romero is Professor of History of Post-War European Cooperation and Integration in the Department of History and Civilizations at the EUI, Florence. He is the author of “The History of the Cold War” (Torino: Einaudi, 2009), and co-editor with Emmanuel Marlon-Drule co-edited of a book on international summits and global governance titled “Governance: The Rise of the G7 and the European Council, 1974-1991” (London: Routledge, 2014). He is currently working on a book titled “The Integration of Post-Imperial Europe in a Globalizing World, 1968-1991.”
As more and more time passes since the end of the Cold War, more and more questions confront historians not just about the era, but the very concept of “cold war” itself. A transnational, decentralized approach has become an integral part of Cold War historiography. Historians are departing from the view of this period as a conflict between two superpowers, the United States and the USSR, shifting their focus to the so-called zone of the “global south:” Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. Cold War history encompasses an ever greater geographical zone developing on macro and micro levels. Diplomatic and political history has ceased to dominate this field. Instead, the intellectual history of the Cold War, the history of human rights movements, media history, etc. are all being developed. Professor Romero, however, urges caution in the matter of historiographical expansion. Will we continue to primarily discuss a single global history of the Cold War, or rather a multiplicity of histories in different regions? Are, for example, internal conflicts in Latin America during this period part of the global history of the Cold War? The question remains whether the Cold War will stay at the center of research in such an approach, or whether we are dealing more with the transnational history of global changes during the second half of the 20th century.
To sort out this confusion, we must first answer the question of what the Cold War was. Anders Stephanson has called the Cold War a state of total war, though this definition is valid only for the period between 1947 and 1963 and is not suitable to characterize the “détente” period. In contrast, John Gaddis describes the cold War as a “lasting peace,” which is too radical a definition and of little benefit for Romero. In his opinion, the most productive understanding of the Cold War is as an ideological standoff. He cites Robert Jervis’ approach, which defines the Cold War as clash of social systems and identities, as well as David Engerman’s definition of the Cold War as a battle of ideas. In light of these approaches the Cold War appears to be a strategically important ideological conflict for determining the world’s future. The two superpowers battled for domination not over material resources or physical space, but for the direction of vectors of historical development. Because these vectors were too different, peace between the two sides was impossible. However, within the ideological approach a question is raised about the ideological boundaries of the Cold War on local conflicts and processes. As Matthew Connelly points out, regional changes obeyed their own logic rather than that of the Cold War, even when backed by one of the superpowers.
Another key issue in Cold War research is its connection to global history and a hierarchy of historical narratives. According to Romero, the aspects of the Cold War that were relevant at the time of its unfolding are precisely not what interest contemporary researchers. Moreover, he believes that the Cold War undoubtedly influenced changes in politics, culture, and the economies of different countries, but was not the determining factor. Thus, at the micro level the Cold War can be called a process without consequences, while its importance in global history is undeniable.
Recently, a significant number of studies have appeared on how the Cold War was deployed in the Third World. Here (also known as the “global south”), unlike in Europe and the United States, where this period could certainly have been called “the lasting peace,” armed conflicts were quite numerous. Romero pointed out that these conflicts and the countries in which they occurred occupy an incomparably greater place in historiography than do analyses of peaceful Third World countries. He also stressed that the opposing superpowers did not create regional conflicts, but rather supported or intensified already existing local oppositions.
A revision is required of Europe’s place in the Cold War. If previous Cold War studies were dominated by the history of Soviet-American relations, then the focus has now shifted to the Third World. In Romero’s opinion, however, it is namely Europe that is located at the political and symbolic center of the Cold War. Besides the fact that the conflict itself started over the fate of postwar Germany, parts of Europe divided into east and west became the main stage for the struggle for “hearts and minds.” Not one conflict in the “global south” had such an impact on the course of the Cold War as did events in Europe. Moreover, as Romero points out, the history of “détente,” the period when cooperation and interaction between the Eastern Bloc and the rest of Europe became more important than conflict and confrontation, remains poorly understood.
A return to European history after studies of the “global south” is important within the process of the “provincialization” of Europe—that is considering it in a comparative perspective as only one of many regions in the world. This epistemological procedure is all the more relevant when we remember that the main clusters of development within contemporary global history are located in China, Brazil, and Mexico. Unfortunately, amongst Russian researchers of the international history of the Cold War we can point only to Vladislav Zubok, who currently teaches at the London School of Economics.
Olga Yakushenko
