Alexander Nesterov: Stealed-bid Auctions: Detecting Bid Leakage via Semi-supervised Learning

Добавить в календарь 2020-04-23 18:00:00 2024-04-25 23:05:28 Аукционы со скрытыми ставками: обнаружение утечек информации о торгах с помощью полуавтоматического обучения Description Department of Economics info@eusp.org Europe/Moscow public
Date:
23.04.2020
Time:
18:00
Organizer:
Department of Economics
Speaker:
Alexander Nesterov

On April 23, Alexander Nesterov (HSE St. Petersburg) will provide estimates of the prevalence of bid leakage (one of the mechanisms for falsifying auctions when information is transmitted to one of the participants to obtain an unfair advantage) at Russian procurement auctions. In his research, he found out that bid leakage is more likely in auctions with a higher reserve price, lower number of bidders and lower price fall, and where the winning bid is received close to the deadline. 

The meeting will take place on the Zoom online platform. The entrance will be through the "waiting room" (https://zoom.us/j/93432922271).