21 декабря в 18:00 Игорь Слоев (ЕУСПб) представит статью “Strategic choice of strategy or How Kantians may perform better than Nashers in mutual interaction”.
We study interaction of two types of players playing a public good contribution game. The first type is called Kantians, these player takes their decision using Kantian criteria of optimization (as it formulated by Roemer [2019]). The second type is Nashers, these players use a standard Nash criterion of maximization. We allow players to choose (or to change) their type during a game and demonstrate that under certain model specifications adoption of Kantian behavior by all players is an equilibrium outcome.
Рабочий язык семинара: русский.
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Фото: Unsplash