Городской экономический семинар “Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat”

Добавить в календарь 2024-03-28 18:00:00 2024-04-29 06:41:20 Городской экономический семинар “Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat” Description Онлайн Department of Economics info@eusp.org Europe/Moscow public
Date:
28.03.2024
Time:
18:00
Hall:
Онлайн
Organizer:
Department of Economics

 28-го марта в 18:00 Екатерина Травова (University of Copenhagen) представит доклад “Under pressure? Performance evaluation of police officers as an incentive to cheat”.

This paper examines the use of high-powered performance-based incentives for civil servants, focusing on drug-related cases registered by the Russian police. Using an event study approach and bunching analysis, I show that the incentives arising from the performance evaluation system of police officers can significantly influence their behavior. Specifically, I find evidence suggesting that this impact can result in the manipulation of drug quantities seized by the police, moving offenders from below to above the punishment threshold. Further negative consequences of the strong performance-based incentives are inequality in the enforcement of law, prolonged sentences, and increased probability of pretrial detention. Thus, I determine that police officers are more likely to manipulate the drug quantities seized from men. I also find that the manipulation increases the probability of pretrial detention by 9% and adds one more year of incarceration, which is a 67% increase on the average sentence length without manipulation.

Мероприятие состоится онлайн. Для участия зарегистрируйтесь на Timepad.

Фото: Unsplash

Registration