

CONCLUSION

This book has focused on a number of issues regarding anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust. I have examined the rise of European anti-Semitism through the lens of the religious, economic, racial, and political roots of anti-Semitism. These four roots of anti-Semitism appear to have been instrumental in the formation of anti-Jewish narratives emerging between 1879 and 1939. The four anti-Jewish narratives gained credence from the effects of declining economic well-being, increased Jewish immigration, growth of leftist support, and identification of Jews with the leadership of the political left. However, popular support for anti-Semitism varied temporally and spatially. Anti-Semitism, as measured by acts and attitudes, reached its highest points between the two world wars, particularly in Germany and Romania. Anti-Semitic levels in both Great Britain and France were significantly lower than those in Germany and Romania. The case of France may come as a surprise to many, in light of France's Dreyfus Affair experience and the oft-cited writings of many of France's rightist intellectuals. The conventional wisdom would have it that France, notably during the mid-1930s, with the circulation of the popular slogan *vaut mieux Hitler que Blum* (better Hitler than Blum), was a hotbed of anti-Semitism. The empirical data do not support this contention, however, at least as it may apply to the French middle and lower classes. Italy remained relatively untouched by anti-Semitism, at least until 1936. We have seen that in the case of Italy, the immigration of Eastern European Jews and the identification of Jews with the Italian revolutionary left never materialized as significant issues.

Though I have limited my study to five European nations, I would propose that these findings may be generalized to other European societies.

The case of Bulgaria is illustrative. The Jewish community of Bulgaria largely escaped the destruction of the Holocaust. During World War II, Bulgaria was an ally of Nazi Germany. In March 1943, when Nazi officials ordered the deportation of Bulgaria's 50,000 Jews, King Boris and the Bulgarian government refused to implement the Nazi order. Why? Bulgaria, much like Italy, possessed low levels of anti-Semitism. Like Italy's, Bulgarian Jews were not overrepresented in the Bulgarian communist movement; like Italy's, Bulgarian Jews were largely Sephardic Jews, who had come to Bulgaria from Spain after 1492; and like Italy's, Bulgarian Jews were highly assimilated into Bulgarian society.¹ In brief, pre-Holocaust Gentile attitudes toward Jews in Europe may have been largely shaped by the degree to which declining economic well-being, increased Jewish immigration, growth of leftist support, and identification of Jews with the leadership of the political left were capable of igniting the religious, racial, economic, and political roots of anti-Semitism.

In the following paragraphs, I will attempt to demonstrate empirically the relationship between spatial and temporal variations in anti-Semitism and Jewish immigration, declining economic conditions, and popular support for the left. I have proposed that, within the context of the four roots of anti-Semitism, temporal and spatial variations across the five nations resulted chiefly from the effects of four critical factors. I propose, in short, that increased levels of Jewish immigration (typically from Eastern and Central Europe) should affect levels of popular anti-Semitism in several ways. Since many of the new Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe possessed few resources and little formal education, they typically competed with many in the host population for low-paying jobs. Competition often bred animosity, resulting in heightened levels of anti-Semitism. Furthermore, the Yiddish-speaking new arrivals from

¹ I suggest that the Sephardic-Ashkenazic distinction is far from perfect in terms of differences in Gentile antipathy toward Jews or rates of Jewish victimization during the Holocaust. We cannot forget the bravery of the Danes in resisting Nazi persecution of Danish Jews. The saved Jews of Denmark were largely Ashkenazic, rather than Sephardic. What is essential here is the degree to which Jews were assimilated. Avaham Ben-Ya'akov, "The Bulgarian Jewish Community, 1879-1950: A Model of Zionist Fulfillment," *SHVUT*, vol. 6, no. 22, 1997, 184-205; Tzvetan Todorov, *The Fragility of Goodness: Why Bulgaria's Jews Survived the Holocaust*, trans. A. Denner (Princeton, 1999), 31, 122. In forthcoming research, I am applying my model of the rise of and variations in anti-Semitism to a study of Bulgaria before the Holocaust.

Eastern Europe's Jewish ghettos (Ashkenazic Jews), with their strange customs and religious practices, frequently struck Western European Gentiles as very different from the more assimilated Sephardic Jews, who had lived in the West for centuries. The influx of Eastern European Jews should have fueled the negative racial stereotypes existing within Western European culture and thereby have contributed to growing anti-Semitism. Particularly in the aftermath of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, many European Gentiles associated recent Eastern European Jewish immigrants with Bolshevism. Given that many of these Jewish immigrants appeared impoverished, had fled persecution, and came from the former Russian empire, they were perceived to favor parties of the political left. Thus, increased Jewish immigration should have heightened religious, racial, economic, and political antipathies toward Jews, and we should expect that increasing Jewish immigration fueled increasing anti-Semitism. A decline in a nation's economic well-being, particularly in an environment in which Jews are seen as controlling or owning major economic resources, should produce higher levels of anti-Jewish feelings. On the other hand, we should not expect to find high levels of anti-Semitic sentiment in times of economic stability or growth or in situations where Jews are not perceived to be in positions of dominance within a nation's economy. The dramatic rise of the revolutionary left at the end of the nineteenth century led to the fear of a violent overturn of the existing social, economic, political, and religious order in Europe. In the popular consciousness, Jews were often linked to the revolutionary left. Many anti-Semites cited Jews as the founders of revolutionary socialism and anarchism and saw the hand of Jews in periodic labor unrest. Thus, we should expect to see increased anti-Semitism in societies where the political left exhibited growing strength and where prominent leftist leaders were identified as Jews. However, where support for the political left was weak or declining, or where Jews were not seen as playing important roles in the left, we should expect lower levels of anti-Semitism. Unfortunately, there exists no comparable empirical yardstick to measure the magnitude of the public's perception of Jewish identification with the revolutionary left within the five countries. Throughout this study, I have relied principally upon the secondary literature's accounts of the alleged association between Jews and the revolutionary left in each of the five countries.

Table 6.1 presents the results of a regression analysis of anti-Semitic acts for the 1899–1939 period on GDP per capita, Jewish immigration,

TABLE 6.1. Regression of anti-Semitic acts in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Romania on predictor variables, 1899–1939

| Variable | Unstandardized Coefficient (Standardized Coefficient) |
|---------------------|--|
| Year | .010** (.255) |
| Great Britain | .308 (.250) |
| France | .128 (.103) |
| Germany (1899–1932) | .296** (.107) |
| Germany (1933–39) | .954** (.189) |
| Romania | .590** (.478) |
| GDP | -.013* (-.341) |
| Jewish immigration | .188* (.089) |
| Leftist vote | -.003 (-.091) |
| Constant | -18.086** |
| R-square | .502 |

* $p < .05$, one-tailed; ** $p < .05$, two-tailed

Note: Italy is the reference category for country variables. Numbers in parentheses represent the standardized coefficients.

and leftist vote. To test my proposition, I employ least squares regression with dummy variables (LSDV).²

² To test my hypothesis I utilize pooled time series methods, which allow me to capture variation in all variables both over time and across space. LSDV is a pooled time series estimator applicable when the dependent variable is heterogeneous across groups, as is the case in the present analysis (Lois Sayrs, *Pooled Time Series Analysis*, Newbury Park, CA, Sage 1989). The LSDV model includes dummy variables representing the respective countries of interest, thus making it a fixed-effects model. Since Italy recorded the fewest anti-Semitic acts, it was used as the reference category in the dummy set. Further, I included a dummy variable representing Hitler's rule in Germany (1933–39). I propose that this is necessary

The results of the regression analysis show clearly that GDP per capita and Jewish immigration are good predictors of variations in anti-Semitic acts for the five countries. More specifically, while controlling for the effects of year, country, and Jewish population, the relationship between GDP per capita and anti-Semitic acts and between Jewish immigration and anti-Semitic acts are significant and in the predicted direction. However, the relationship between leftist voting and anti-Semitic acts does not conform to my model's expectations. The variables together (both control and independent) explained more than one-half the variance in anti-Semitic acts.³

The multiple regression analysis found no significant relationship between leftist voting and anti-Semitic acts. However, the scholarly literature on European anti-Semitism, especially for the interwar period, points explicitly to a link between leftist voting strength and anti-Semitism. It should be added that this link frequently included the charge of Jewish identification with the revolutionary left. Why doesn't the empirical analysis pick up this relationship? I believe there are a couple of reasons for this. In large part, we can attribute the weak relationship to Romania's high number of anti-Semitic acts and low level of

because the political and social climate in Germany was vastly different during this period. Moreover, I control for year in the analysis, again in order to control for sociopolitical changes not encompassed by the set of independent variables. Finally, although I justify the use of Italy as the reference category in the LSDV analysis, the choice is still rather arbitrary. Thus, I employ Stimson's (James A. Stimson, "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay," *American Journal of Political Science*, vol 29, no. 4, 1985, 914-47) approach and do not interpret the dummy variable coefficients, even though they do make substantive sense in the present analysis. Also, because I have no exact measure of annual immigration by country, I choose to measure immigration by change in the percentage of Jews residing in a country from the previous year. Since it is generally recognized that between 1881 and 1940 Jewish immigrants come almost exclusively from Central and Eastern Europe, the figures for increased Jewish population should largely represent Jewish immigration.

³ I ran a random effects model to help correct for correlated errors, and the substantive findings held. Thus, it appears that the model employed for the analysis of anti-Semitic acts is robust across model specifications. Additionally, the three variables of theoretical interest—immigration, GDP per capita, and leftist voting—by themselves explain 28 percent of the variance in anti-Semitic acts for the 1899–1932 period and 20 percent of the variance for the 1899–1939 period. Moreover, I ran additional models controlling for Jewish population, and all results in all analyses replicated, but I did not include Jewish population because it is highly collinear with the variable representing Romania.

leftist voting. As mentioned earlier, Romania's relatively lower level of industrialization throughout the period of this study failed to nurture the growth of a large industrial proletariat – a class from which the Marxist left traditionally drew adherents. The left was never a major political contender in Romania's politics. Nevertheless, fear of the left and identification of Jews with the left were obsessions among many segments of the Romanian population. This fear derived largely from the proximity of Bolshevik Russia, the perception that Bolshevik Russia sought the reannexation of parts of Bessarabia and Bukovina, and the oft-publicized claim that Jews were significantly overrepresented within the leadership of the small and highly antinationalist Romanian Communist Party. The lack of an empirical relationship between leftist voting and anti-Semitic acts in the regression analysis may also be due to the particular case of the Italian left. Italy before 1936 witnessed few anti-Semitic acts, but the political left before Mussolini's seizure of power in 1922 drew substantial popular support. Yet, as I have argued earlier, the allegation of Jewish identification with the Italian left never materialized before 1936 in Italy, due largely to the high proportion of Jews in the Italian Fascist Party.

Table 6.2 shows the results of a regression analysis of anti-Semitic attitudes for the 1899–1939 period on GDP per capita, Jewish immigration, and leftist vote.⁴ Again, I include the same control variables as used in Table 6.1. Unlike the previous analysis of anti-Semitic acts, the regression analysis of anti-Semitic attitudes does not conform to my expectations. From Model 1 in Table 6.2, we see that the three independent variables do not emerge as good predictors of variations in anti-Semitic attitudes for the five countries over the 1899–1939 period. In fact, the explanatory power of the combined control and independent variables accounts for a little more than one-quarter of the explained variance in anti-Semitic attitudes.⁵ That the zero-order correlation between the measures of the two dependent variables (anti-Semitic acts

⁴ I employ the annual proportion of articles unfavorable toward Jews as the measure of anti-Semitic attitudes. Also, as in Table 6.1, I ran additional models controlling for Jewish population, and all results in all analyses replicated, but I did not include Jewish population because it is highly collinear with the variable representing Romania.

⁵ The three variables of theoretical interest—immigration, GDP, and leftist voting—by themselves explain only 5 percent of the variance in anti-Semitic attitudes for the 1899–1932 period and 2 percent of the variance in the dependent variable for the 1899–1939 period.

TABLE 6.2. Regression of anti-Semitic attitudes in Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Romania on predictor variables, 1899–1939

| Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Year | .009** (.492) | .010** (.514) | .009** (.493) |
| Great Britain | .154 (.285) | .153 (.283) | .163 (.303) |
| France | -.023 (-.042) | .013 (.025) | .022 (.041) |
| Germany (1899–1932) | .048 (.082) | .069 (.118) | .057 (.097) |
| Germany (1933–39) | .358** (.305) | .342** (.291) | .344** (.292) |
| Romania | -.103 (-.191) | -.130* (-.242) | -.101 (-.188) |
| GDP | -.006 (-.340) | -.006 (-.347) | -.006* (-.389) |
| Jewish immigration | .009 (.010) | -.226** (-.246) | -.590** (-.644) |
| Leftist vote | -.005** (-.356) | -.006** (-.402) | -.005** (-.321) |
| Jewish immigration * Leftist voting | - | .056** (.317) | - |
| GDP * Jewish immigration | - | - | .041** (.669) |
| Constant | -17.306** | -18.065** | -17.305** |
| R-square | .265 | .298 | .281 |

* $p < .05$, one-tailed; ** $p < .05$, two-tailed

Note: Unstandardized coefficients reported with standardized coefficients in parentheses.

Italy is the reference category for country variables.

The dependent variable in the analysis is the proportion of articles in a given year unfavorable toward Jews.

and attitudes) is a less-than-robust .285 indicates that the relationship between these two measures is far weaker than we might have expected.⁶

⁶ The bivariate correlations show that the relationship between anti-Semitic acts and attitudes is positive and significant for Italy, Germany, and Romania, but negative and nonsignificant for Great Britain and France.

However, before concluding that the explanatory model for anti-Semitic attitudes is unsatisfactory, I decided to examine interaction effects among the independent variables of interest. The theory outlined in this study suggests that anti-Semitic acts and attitudes should vary with changes in GDP per capita, Jewish immigration, and leftist voting. While I posit that these factors will affect anti-Semitism independent of one another, it is also likely that the variables will operate interactively. For example, the expected effect of Jewish immigration may be exacerbated when leftist voting is high, but may be muted when leftist voting is low. Similar conditional relationships may hold for other combinations of variables as well. Thus, I added interaction terms to the models in order to test for conditional relationships between the variables.

The interaction term in Model 2 of Table 6.2 represents the interaction of Jewish immigration and leftist voting. The coefficient, in conjunction with the main effects portion of the model, suggests that Jewish immigration has a weak and positive effect on anti-Semitic attitudes when leftist voting is low. However, the effect is strong and positive when leftist voting is high.⁷ Conversely, leftist voting has a negative effect on anti-Semitic attitudes when Jewish immigration is decreasing, but has a positive effect when immigration is increasing. This finding is consistent with my theory.

As presented in Model 3 of Table 6.2, I also found a significant interaction effect between GDP per capita and Jewish immigration. In this case, the effect of Jewish immigration on anti-Semitic attitudes is positive and strong when GDP per capita levels are higher. Conversely, the negative effect of GDP per capita is exacerbated when Jewish immigration is declining. This finding did not support my theory.⁸

⁷ To test for interaction at high and low levels of leftist voting, I use the values at plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean to represent high and low levels. This strategy was repeated when testing interaction effects with other variables as well.

⁸ These were the only interactions that proved robust across both fixed effects and random coefficient models. There was evidence of a significant three-way interaction between GDP per capita, leftist voting, and Jewish immigration, which increased the explained variance in the model (R-square) to .364, but the coefficients were sensitive to changes in the model, and thus I would report them only tentatively. Also, aggregate graphs of GDP per capita, Jewish immigration, and leftist voting suggested that there are very few times and places where the three variables converge in a manner that would lead the theory to predict high levels of anti-Semitism (i.e., low GDP, high immigration, and leftist voting). This may partially explain the absence of more significant interaction effects. Interestingly,

Notwithstanding the value of adding interaction terms to the model of anti-Semitic attitudes, the relationship between the theoretically important variables and anti-Semitic attitudes is weaker than expected. How might one explain this finding? The relatively low number of unfavorable articles contained in the various newspapers certainly contributes. For the entire 41-year period, the sampling produced a total of 141 unfavorable articles for the five countries (compared to 1,295 anti-Semitic acts for the same period). With so few articles for a study of five countries over a forty-one-year period, it is often difficult to locate statistically significant relationships. However, the sample size does permit us to detect broad spatial and temporal patterns. To that end, we have seen in Figures 1.8a through 1.8d that the number of unfavorable articles about Jews was nineteen between 1899 and 1913, twelve between 1914 and 1923, eighteen between 1924 and 1932, and ninety-two between 1933 and 1939. Clearly, the 1930s marked a dramatic shift in newspaper reportage on Jews, most notably in Germany, Italy, and Romania. It should be pointed out that only thirty-seven of the ninety-two unfavorable articles published between 1933 and 1939 were published in the principal German newspaper.

Though this book has primarily sought to examine temporal and societal variations in European anti-Semitism before the Holocaust, it has touched upon a set of issues quite relevant to the phenomenon of anti-Semitism. Among those issues are the uniqueness of German anti-Semitism; the place of anti-Semitism within the pantheon of ethnic, religious, and racial prejudice; and the likelihood of another Holocaust. I now address each of these points.

In one of the most provocative assertions characterizing German anti-Semitism, Daniel J. Goldhagen recently opined: "... much *positive* evidence exists that anti-Semitism, albeit an anti-Semitism evolving in content with the changing times, continued to be an axiom of German culture throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and that its regnant version in Germany during its Nazi period was but a more accentuated, intensified, and elaborated form of an already broadly accepted basic model."⁹ If Goldhagen is correct, we might expect to find

these aggregate graphs (not shown) indicate that immediately after World War I, there was a drop in GDP and a simultaneous increase in Jewish immigration and leftist voting. Incidentally, this time point also represents the highest levels of anti-Semitic acts prior to Hitler's election in Germany.

⁹ Goldhagen, *Hitler's*, 32.

consistently higher levels of anti-Semitism, as expressed by acts and attitudes, in Germany than in our other four countries, as well as relatively high levels of anti-Semitism in Germany prior to the Nazi period. The empirical data do not support Goldhagen's claim. As presented in Chapter 1, 401 of the 703 anti-Semitic acts reported for Germany for the 1899–1939 period occurred between 1933 and 1939. In other words, between 1933 and 1939, Germany experienced roughly fifty-seven anti-Semitic acts per year, contrasted to approximately nine anti-Semitic acts per year between 1899 and 1932. What about the newspaper reportage on German anti-Semitism? In Figures 1.8a through 1.8d, we also witnessed a dramatic turnabout in German newspaper reportage beginning in 1933. Prior to 1933, the reportage on Jews by Germany's largest circulating newspaper, the *Berliner Morgenpost*, indicated a generally benign treatment. A skeptic might allege that the *Berliner Morgenpost's* reportage on Jews prior to 1933 was unrepresentative of the German newsprint medium. Indeed, we glean clearly from Figure 1.9 that for the years 1921, 1933, 1935, and 1939, the reportage on Jews by the *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten* was substantially more extensive than the *Berliner Morgenpost's* reportage. But it would be premature to conclude from this that the two German newspapers differed significantly in regard to *orientation* toward Jews or that an unfavorable tone existed in German newspaper reportage both before and after 1933. The results shown in Figure 1.9 derive from a selection of years that includes only one time point prior to 1933: Hitler's ascension to power.

In order to examine more precisely variation in German newspaper reportage before and after 1933, as well as to look more closely at the thesis of a German *Sonderweg* of anti-Semitism, I directed my German research assistants to compare the reportage on Jews in the *Berliner Morgenpost* and the *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten* for selected years between 1919 and 1939.¹⁰ The years, chosen at random, were 1919, 1921, 1925, 1930, 1933, 1935, and 1939. Figure 6.1 presents the results. Without question, the reportage on Jews in *both* German newspapers is hardly unfavorable. All thirteen articles in the pre-1933 sample of the *Berliner Morgenpost* are neutral in tone, while ten of the fourteen articles from the *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten* are neutral. Of the remaining four articles in the *Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten*, three are favorable

¹⁰ In Figure 1.9, which focused on intranational newspaper reportage for the five countries, there is only one year, 1921, that is prior to 1933 included in the analysis.




Figure 6.1. German newspapers' orientation toward Jews by newspaper for the years 1919, 1921, 1925, 1930, 1933, 1935, and 1939. *Note:* Articles were coded "unfavorable" if the article reflected negatively on Jews, if the author's tone expressed disdain for Jews, or if the article supported actions that adversely affected Jews. Articles were taken from the fifteenth of the month for every month in the respective years and newspapers.

and one is unfavorable. The comparison of these two newspapers prior to 1933 shows consistency in both tone and volume of articles. The results demonstrate that the 1933–39 period marked a clear divergence in both the volume of articles and the tone of both German newspapers. For the 1933–39 time frame, the Munich paper's coverage of Jews far surpassed the coverage of the Berlin newspaper. Both newspapers exhibited a pronounced increase in unfavorable articles about Jews after Hitler's ascension to power. All told, the results of Figure 6.1 manifestly point to 1933 as a defining fork in German newspaper reportage on Jews, and dash water on the contention that anti-Semitism is an axiom of German culture.

How does anti-Semitism compare to other forms of religious, ethnic, and racial prejudice? Earlier, I suggested that what made anti-Semitism different from other forms of xenophobia or dislike of minorities is that Jew-hatred is more multidimensional than other kinds of prejudice. In the preceding chapters, I have argued that anti-Semitism incorporated religious, racial, economic, and political forms of hatred. Jews were disliked and *feared* for their religious beliefs and attitudes, their alleged racial characteristics, their perceived economic behavior and power, and their assumed leadership or support of subversive political and social movements. The multifaceted nature of anti-Semitism should help to explain why Jews, rather than other minorities, were frequently sought out as scapegoats or useful targets during periods of both worldwide and national difficulties, and why antipathy toward Jews appealed to so many complex groups. The complex character of anti-Semitism may also imply that Jew-hatred is a more intense form of antipathy than other forms of prejudice. Helen Fein's poignant observation about the Holocaust appears to suggest such a claim. Fein wrote: "Now we know how many of Hitler's orders were averted, subverted, or countermanded—extermination of tubercular Poles, mass deportation of the Dutch, catching the Jews of Denmark, burning of Paris, destruction of Germany. The order to exterminate the Jews was not checked because it was already taken for granted that getting rid of the Jews was a legitimate objective."¹¹ But quantitative assessments of the magnitude of religious, racial, and ethnic hatred are intrinsically difficult to make. For who could state without hesitation that the hatred of Jews by European anti-Semites attained greater force than the loathing of Kurds in Iraq, Armenians in Turkey, Chinese in Indonesia, Muslims in the former

¹¹ Fein, *Accounting*, 91–92.

Yugoslavia, or Gypsies in Central Europe by large segments of the host populations?

In search of a clearer understanding of the heterogeneous nature of anti-Semitism and how anti-Semitic prejudice might compare to other forms of prejudice against minorities, I decided to compare popular antipathies toward Jews and Gypsies (Roma) before the Holocaust. There are many compelling reasons to compare anti-Jewish and anti-Gypsy sentiments. As is the case with the Jews, the Gypsies are a minority that has often suffered from widespread discrimination in Europe. Both Jews and Gypsies encountered hostility for their alleged racial and economic traits.¹² And like the Jews, the Gypsies were targeted for elimination by the Nazis.

Based on linguistic evidence, it is commonly believed that the Gypsies originated in India. They supposedly migrated westward from India beginning nearly one thousand years ago. By the fifteenth century, small groups of Gypsies had reached Western Europe, after sojourning in Asia Minor and Eastern Europe. The word "Gypsy" is an English adulteration of Egyptian and most likely gained currency in early sixteenth century England.¹³ Like the Jews of medieval Europe, the Gypsies made their living from a small number of trades. They worked primarily as smiths, metalworkers, producers of baskets, combs, and jewelry, and as fortune-tellers.¹⁴ Within a century after their arrival in Central and Western Europe, the Gypsies were subjected to persecution. Again, as in the case of the Jews of medieval Europe, several European states between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries expelled the Gypsies, accusing

¹² Unflattering myths about the Gypsies certainly would include references to their alleged racial and economic behavior. Interestingly, Kenrick and Puxon have suggested the presence of religious leitmotifs within the constellation of anti-Gypsy sentiment. According to these authors, among some groups in Christian Europe, it was thought that Gypsies denied shelter to Joseph and Mary on their escape from Egypt, and that they shared blame with the Jews for Christ's crucifixion. By one such account, a Gypsy artisan made the nails used to crucify Christ (Donald Kenrick and Grattan Puxon, *The Destiny of Europe's Gypsies*, London, 1972, 26–27).

¹³ The Gypsies have been referred to by various appellations, including Sinti and Roma. In the British Isles, they were frequently called Travellers and Tinkers (Judith Okey, *The Traveller-Gypsies*, Cambridge, 1983, 18–19). And as is the case for the word "Jew," official English-language dictionaries include a derogatory definition for a derivative of the word "Gypsy." To "gyp" is defined as to cheat or swindle.

¹⁴ Okey, *Traveller-Gypsies*, 1–11; Kenrick and Puxon, *Destiny*, 13–17, 23–24.

"Roots of Hate offers the first empirically based comparative study of popular anti-Semitism in Europe before World War Two. Drawing on a unique database, the systematic inventory of anti-Jewish acts and attitudes in France, Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and Romania over 40 years (1899–1939), William Brustein brilliantly refutes Daniel Goldhagen's explanation of the Holocaust by the uniqueness of German political culture. Outlining instead the multifaceted nature of anti-Semitism, he links its temporal and spatial variations with the level of economic recession, Eastern European Jewish immigration, support for the Revolutionary Left, and identification of its leaders with Jews. A masterly demonstration based on facts, not on passion, and accessible to all readers, on a more than ever topical issue."

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"William Brustein's *Roots of Hate* is a masterful, probing survey of anti-Semitism in critical European countries from the late 19th century to 1939. It stresses its multidimensional roots and avoids simplistic generalizations. It should be read by people concerned with insight as well as with social scientific theory.

– Helen Fein, Executive Director,
Institute for the Study of Genocide, New York

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