

Towards an Interpretative Framework for Post-Communist Autocracies

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Illusions debunked by stubborn structures

Illusions:

- of linear progress towards liberal democracies after the change of the political regimes in 1989-1990;
- that any regime can be built on any kind of ruins of communist dictatorships.

Stubborn structures:

- the lack of proper separation of the three spheres of social action (political, market, communal) (Claus Offe);
- collusion of power&ownership (Andrey Ryabov);
- *patrimonialization*: private appropriation of the public authority (Max Weber, Oleksandr Fisun);
- patron-client relations (Henry Hale);
- centralized and monopolized forms of corruption.

The Democracy—Dictatorship Axis

Liberal democracy	Electoral democracy	Competitive authoritarianism	Hegemonic authoritarianism	Closed authoritarianism
<hr/>				
Democracy	Autocracy		Dictatorship	

- **Upper categories:** Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G. Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 2 (April 1, 2006): 367
- **Bottom categories:** János Kornai, “The System Paradigm Revisited,” *Acta Oeconomica* 66, no. 4 (1, 2016): 565

János Kornai: Characteristics of Democracy, Autocracy, and Dictatorship

(Primary features)

		Democracy	Autocracy	Dictatorship
P R I M A R Y	1	The government can be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure	The government cannot be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure	The government cannot be removed through a peaceful and civilized procedure
	2	Institutions which concertedly guarantee accountability are well-established	Institutions which could concertedly guarantee accountability are either formal or weak	Institutions which could allow/guarantee accountability do not exist
	3	Legal parliamentary opposition exists; multiple parties run for elections	Legal parliamentary opposition exists; multiple parties run for elections	No legal parliamentary opposition; only one party runs for elections
	4	No terror (large-scale detention in forced-labor camps and executions)	No terror (large-scale detention in forced-labor camps and executions), but various means of coercion are used against political adversaries (imprisonment with false allegation, or politically motivated murder)	Terror (large-scale detention in forced-labor camps and executions)

János Kornai: Characteristics of Democracy, Autocracy, and Dictatorship

(Secondary features)

		Democracy	Autocracy	Dictatorship
S E C O N D A R Y	5	No repressive means are used against parliamentary opposition	Repressive means are used against parliamentary opposition	No parliamentary opposition
	6	Institutions of “checks and balances” are active and independent	Institutions functioning as “checks and balances” are weak and non-independent	No institutions have been created to act as “checks and balances”
	7	Relatively few officials are appointed by the ruling political group	The ruling political group appoints its own cadres to virtually all important offices	The ruling political group appoints its own cadres to all important offices
	8	Civil protest against the government has no legal boundary; strong civil society	Civil protest against the government has no legal boundary; weak civil society	Civil protest against the government is prohibited by law
	9	Interested persons and their organizations take part in many forms and to relevant degrees in preparations for decision-making (significant levels of participation)	There are legal frameworks for participation but they are practically dysfunctional	Participation is not even formally prescribed
	10	Freedom of the press is guaranteed by law, and is actually enforced	Freedom of the press is constrained by legal and economic means	No freedom of the press

Post-communist countries by political institutional system (János Kornai)


Democracies	Autocracies	Dictatorships
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia , Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan	China, Vietnam, North Korea

The problems with the purely political institutional approach

- Under each category, there is a heterogeneous set of cases.
- It sticks to the political level, disregarding the stubborn sociological and economic structures connected to it.
- How can we incorporate into the typology of Post-Communist regimes further dimensions?
 - *ownership relations;*
 - *economy;*
 - *structure of the ruling elite?*

Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes

(combining the political, economic and sociological dimensions)



Who is the actor?

Interpretative layers of categories to describe the mafia state

	The type of state	Interpretive layers of the category	To which features of the state the category refers to
1.	State (operated by formal institutions)	Monopoly on the right to authorize the legitimate use of violence	Institution by which the ruling elite exercises legitimate coercion
2.	Network state	1st feature + increasing informal character of the connections within and between the units of the state	The ruling elite's exercising power through mainly informal power network
3.	Patronal state	1st + 2nd features + the personal, patronal, hierarchically dependent character of the ruling elite	The ruling elite's internal dependency, patron-client relations (patronal power network)
4.	Clan state	1st + 2nd + 3rd features + the adopted political family (political-economic clan) structure of the ruling elite	The ruling elite's anthropological structure and cultural patterns
5.	Mafia state	1st + 2nd + 3rd + 4th features + the illegal character of the ruling elite's practice of power	The legality of the ruling elite's actions

What is the action?

Interpretative layers of categories to describe the mafia state

	The type of state	Interpretive layers of the category	To which features of the state the category refers to
1.	State (driven by public good)	Monopoly of taxation (tax, rent, etc.) for maintaining public functions	Primary source of state revenues
2.	Rent-seeking state	1st feature + legal overtaxing in favor of public or private actors	Favoritism to expand state bureaucracy for supporters
3.	Kleptocratic state	1st + 2nd features + non-legal diverting of current incomes to private hands	Illegal favoritism
4.	Predatory state	1st + 2nd + 3rd features + expropriation of property using non-legal state coercion	Illegal predation

Internal dimensions: public policy vs. private goals; normative vs. discretionary; legal vs. non-legal

Is the action legal?

Interpretative layers of categories to describe the mafia state

	The type of state	Interpretive layers of the category	To which features of the state the category refers to
1.	State (respecting the constitution)	Monopoly of taxation (tax, rent, etc.) for maintaining public functions	Primary source of state revenues
2.	Corrupt state	1st feature + the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (occasional, non-stable chains of vassalage)	Corruption = deviant element of the system
3.	Partially captured state	1st + 2nd features + chains of corrupt vassalage with a permanent character	Corruption = structural element of the system
4.	Criminal state	1st + 2nd + 3rd features + subordinated to and monopolized by a political enterprise (governance led as a criminal organization)	Corruption = constituting element of the system

Key system components and actors in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy	Post-communist patronal autocracy	Communist regime
head of the executive power (president / PM)	chief patron (patronal presidentialism)	general party secretary
govern (within formal authorization)	dispose (beyond formal authorization)	command (within formal authorization)
government	patron's court	politburo
autonomous elites	adopted political family	nomenklatura
multi-party system	dominant-party system	one-party system
political party governing party democratic party	patron's party transmission belt party vassal party	state party cadre party centralised party
politician	poligarch (political entrepreneur) / political stooge	high level party cadre/functionary
public servant	patronal servant	administrative cadre аппаратчик (apparatchik)
entrepreneur	oligarch / minigarch	state enterprise leader
lobbyist	corruption broker	толкач, „pusher”
business interest representation	facilitating corrupt exchange	plan or barter bargain
not applicable	economic stooge (strohmann)	not applicable

Four „evolutionary” stages of corruption

<i>Petty Corruption</i>	Systemic or non-systemic	Horizontal	Non-centralised	Competitive	Voluntary	Ad hoc	Kickback money
<i>Oligarchic state capture</i>	Systemic or non-systemic	Parallel verticals (bottom-up)	Moderately centralised	Oligopolistic / local or vertical monopolies	Voluntary / coercive	Temporary / partial dependency	Kickback money
<i>Party state capture</i>	Systemic or non-systemic	Parallel verticals (top-down)	Partially centralised	Oligopolistic / local or vertical monopolies	Voluntary / Coercive	Permanent / partial dependency (vassal chains)	Protection money
<i>Criminal state</i>	Systemic	Single vertical (top-down)	Centralised	Monopolistic	Coercive	Permanent / general dependency (vassal chains)	Protection money

Patterns of corruption in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy	Post-communist patronal autocracy	Communist regime
competitive market corruption	relational market corruption	administrative market corruption
surplus corruption	n.a.	shortage corruption
sellers' corruption	n.a.	buyers' corruption
system destroying corruption	system constituting corruption	system lubricating corruption
corrupting individuals, firms + organized underworld	organized upperworld + organized underworld + corrupting individuals	corrupting individuals
kickback money + protection money	protection money + kickback money	kickback money
generally/normatively sanctioned	selectively preferred (<u>крыша</u> , „roof”) or sanctioned	moderately tolerated


Types and some features of reiderstvo in post-communist regimes

Strength of the state	„Legitimacy” of raiding	The initiator or client of the corporate raiding			
		<i>Organized upperworld: chief patron (top level public authority)</i>	<i>Low or middle level public authority</i>	<i>Rival entrepreneurs or oligarchs</i>	<i>Organized underworld: criminal groups</i>
Strong state Weak state	White raiding	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX		
	Gray raiding	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
	Black raiding			XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Institutional environment and features of the raiding action		<i>Criminal state</i>	<i>State crime</i>	<i>Corporate crime</i>	<i>Crime</i>
		Single-pyramid patronal system	Multi-pyramid patronal system		
		Monopolized	Oligarchic		Competitive
		Market and oligarch capture	Partial state capture		

Social/economic integration schemes/coordinates mechanisms in three ideal-type political regimes

Capitalist system		Socialist system
Market economy	Relational economy	Planned/command economy
Socially/politically „disembedded economy”	Patronally „embedded economy”	Bureaucratically „embedded economy”
Dominant integration scheme/coordinates mechanism		
Competitive market	Relational market-redistribution	Bureaucratic resource-redistribution
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • regulated • impersonal • normative • dominant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • non-formalized • personal • discretionary • dominant 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • formalized • impersonal • normative • general/total
Invisible hand of the impersonal market forces	Visible hand of the patron interfering with market forces	Central planning of the nomenklatura bypassing market forces
Horizontal	Vertical	Vertical

Administrative market

Mechanisms of coordination		Actors of transaction		Goods of transaction
Main mechanism of coordination	Burocratic resource-redistribution	Authorised members of the nomenklatura		Production and consumer inputs
Correcting mechanisms	Legal  Illegal	Queuing, waiting lists	Admin.cadre \leftrightarrow Private person Seller \leftrightarrow Buyer	Consumer goods \leftrightarrow Time
		Plan bargain	Party cadre \leftrightarrow Party cadre Party cadre \leftrightarrow Administrative cadre Admin.cadre \leftrightarrow State Enterprise Leader	Production \leftrightarrow Political influence, loyalty
		Under-planning	Admin.cadre \leftrightarrow State Enterprise Leader	Soft budget \leftrightarrow Illusion of hard budget constraint Future prod.inputs
		Barter	State Enterprise \leftrightarrow State Enterprise Leader Leader	Production \leftrightarrow Production inputs
		Corruption	Administrative cadre \leftrightarrow Private person Seller \leftrightarrow Buyer	Consumer goods \leftrightarrow Money

Competitive market

Mechanisms of coordination		Actors of transaction	Goods of transaction	
Main mechanism of coordination	Market coordination, price mechanism	Private actors	Goods and services	
<i>Distorting mechanisms</i>	Legal	Lobbying	Entrepreneur \leftrightarrow Politician	State regulations and subsidies \leftrightarrow Political success
	↓	Grey market	Buyer \leftrightarrow Seller	Discount on goods/services \leftrightarrow Tax evasion
		Free market corruption	Entrepreneur \leftrightarrow Politician / public servant	Bureaucratic facilitation \leftrightarrow Bribe
		Police corruption	Gangster \leftrightarrow Public servant	Non-enforcement of law \leftrightarrow Bribe
		Party capture	Oligarch \leftrightarrow Party leader	Future state protection \leftrightarrow Party financing
		Illegal	Partial state capture	Oligarch, gangster \leftrightarrow Political elite

Relational market

Mechanisms of coordination		Actors of transaction	Goods of transaction
Main mechanism of coordination		Relational market redistribution	Authorized members of the adopted political family
Annexing mechanisms	Collusion of legal and illegal elements	Political patronalization	Poligarch ↔ patronal servant
		Economic patronalization	Poligarch ↔ oligarch/ strohmann
			Power + ownership/revenues
			Servitude derived from unconditional loyalty ↔ paid with administr. position
			Wealth ↔ discretionary access to resources and markets


Features of “property rights” in three ideal-type political regimes

Liberal democracy	Post-communist patronal autocracy	Communist regime
private property	power&ownership власть&собственность	state property
competitive market	relational market	administrative market
market economy	relational economy	command economy
competitive market	relational market-redistribution	bureaucratic resource redistribution
trading and taxing	taking (taxation, rents, tribute, plunder) and rent-seeking (administrative, budgetary, natural resources)	centralised allocation: (re)distributing
privatization	прихватизация, „grabitization”	n.a.
nationalization	deprivatization, renationalization, patrimonialization	nationalization / collectivization
hostile takeover	reiderstvo (centrally led corporate raiding)	expropriation

Ownership rights – Expropriation of endogenous rights


Result of patronalization /expropriation			Market economy		Relational economy		
			De jure = de facto <i>Matching</i>		De jure \neq de facto <i>Collusion</i> (offshore, strohmann)		
			Normative / persistent regulations		Discretionary / ad hoc regulations		
Endogenous rights		The right	Politician	Entrepreneur	Poligarch	Front man, stooge	Oligarch
Use rights	Access	to enter a defined physical property	-	+	+	+	+
	Withdrawal	to obtain the 'products' of a resource	-	+	+	-	+ -
Control rights	Management	to regulate internal use patterns and transform the resource by making improvements	-	+	+ -	+ -	+
	Exclusion	to determinate who will have an access right, and how that right may be transferred	-	+	+	-	+ -
	Alienation	to sell or lease the rights of management and exclusion	-	+	+	-	+ -

Interpretative Framework of Post-Communist Regimes




The Place of Relational Market-Redistribution among Post-Communist Regime Types

Coordinating mechanisms




Normativity of state regulations




Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:

1. Hungary




Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:

2. Poland




Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:

3. Romania




Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:

4. Ukraine



Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:

5. Russia




The formal position of the chief patron, the decision making “body” and the type of patronal networks in Russia

	The formal position of chief patron (as the head of executive power)	The ruling „body” (the decision making center)	Ruling elite according to the type of patronal networks	Type of the patronal state
before 1917	tsar	court	service gentry, feudal „orders”	feudal state
1917-1991	party general secretary	politburo	nomenklatura	party state
after 1991	president	patron’s court	adopted political family	mafia state


Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:

6. Uzbekistan




Modelled Trajectories of Post-Communist Regimes:


7. China




The Ruling Elites in a Liberal Democracy: Autonomous Elites



The Ruling Elite in a Communist Dictatorship: The Nomenklatura




The Ruling Elite in a Patronal Autocracy: The Adopted Political Family




The „separation of branches of power” within the adopted political family

	Executive power	Party background	Economic power	Media power	Personal wealth
Chief patron	+	+	+	+	+
Poligarch (1)	+	-	-	-	+
Poligarch (2)	-	+	-	-	+
Oligarch (1)	-	-	+	-	+
Oligarch (2)	-	-	-	+	+
Stooge	-	-	-	-	+


The Ruling Elites in a Conservative Autocracy: Authoritarianism with Competing Other Elites



The Ruling Elites in a Patronal Democracy: Competing Patronal Networks



The Ruling Elite in a Bureaucratic Autocracy: Dominant Party Elite



Thank you for your attention.