**Susan Buck-Morss (City University of New York)**

***Revolution Today***

If the contradiction between an all-encompassing, global economy and exclusively national politics situates us in time, what are the implications for political practice? What might it mean for the idea of Revolution today? This talk retrieves certain historical moments during the past century that shed light on the potential for revolutionary transformation today. They provide, not a blue print for revolution, but an awareness of common problems. They are moments of international collaboration in developing new forms of political practice and new theoretical understandings of history itself. And they unleash the transformative potential of multiple traditions, multiple practices, and multiple forms of social life, including the reinvention of democracy. Out of this awareness comes a realistic hope for radical change.

**Artemy Magun (EUSP)**

***The Bet***

What remains of the 1917 revolution today? Can we say (as some do) it is just the communist horizon? But the horizon had been there to start with. Rather an event of this scale bequeaths problems and their tentative historical solutions. Thus, the challenge of the Bolchevik and Soviet task became the difficult synthesis between state and democracy, avant-guardeand the conservative classes, universalism and nationality. USSR did provide paths of synthesis but ultimately failed on all of them. The relevance of 1917 is proven, however, by the fact that these dialectical contradiction continue to determine the present-day world, and end up in deadlocks, which signal, fortunately or not, to a need for new historical explosions.

**Gerald Raunig (University of the Arts, Zurich)**

***Social Revolution, Condividual Revolution, Molecular Revolution***

So many revolutions, precisely the “great” revolutions – the French, the Russian – could hold up little against the terror of structuralization, state apparatification and closure in and of the institution. Parties of the institutionalized revolution, apparatuses of closure and capture, torture racks of social machines. Whereas political revolution aims at taking over the institutional apparatuses, the music of social revolution initially plays on a very different terrain, the machinic-social, the con-dividual, the molecular. It consists in collecting and assembling, inventing and composing sociality beyond and before the state. Social cooperation, social ecology, social-machinic enveloping will always already have been there, underneath the radars of the apparatuses. It is a matter of supporting and expanding this enveloping sociality and smuggling it into the state apparatuses. “The Paris Commune was the definite negation of that State power, and, therefore, the initiation of the social revolution of the nineteenth century,” Karl Marx wrote in the first draft of “The Civil War in France,” and I would like to repeat this sentence and differentiate it on the background of some musings on the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution and the social movements in Spain today.

**Adam Leeds (Columbia University)**

***The Russian Revolution and the Semantics of Political Modernity: Socialism, Republicanism, and Liberalism in the Interregnum***

**Milton Pinheiro (Bahia State University)**

***Historical Aspects of the October Revolution and the Political Scene of the Future***

The analysis of the theme will have as its centrality the interpretation of the main characteristics of Russian social formation and its autocratic past, the historical period in which the social movements that impacted Russian history developed and which opened historical windows to consolidate a process of political struggles that guided The perspective of the revolution. It is a question of understanding, along with the permanent revolutionary process, the societal changes that have modified the characteristics of power. It is important to investigate the role of institutional specificities, the political form by which power has been exercised, and has been politically depleted in the historical process in which the revolutionaries were advanced, with the consequent seizure of state power, to draw lessons for the present. Next to this analysis, it is necessary to understand in what historical-political scenario the changes in the construction of the political-ideological hegemony took place that reaffirmed a new relation of force during the first world war, when the state of new type was exercised by the Bolsheviks. After the events of the February revolution and the Bolshevik victory in October, as the class struggle developed, it became radicalized and became a civil war after revolutionaries took political power and disseminated the organization of councils as a revolutionary instrument of Maintenance and improvement of this class power. What were the main issues in the political struggle to develop, from the state, practices and conceptions that contributed to the defeat of the Russian revolution of October 1917. How this particularity can contribute towards the unveiling of an authoritarian political form Which was gradually changing the nature of the understanding of social transformations in the world. The aim of this paper is to analyze the Russian revolution in October, to discuss the sense of defeat and to examine whether the revolutionary perspectives opened by the Bolsheviks will find a new historical opportunity.

**Sofia Manzano (State University of Southwestern Bahia)**

***The Russian Revolution and Housework***

Housework is, until now, one of the central elements for the debate about the exploitation of workers, more specifically of women's lives, and one of the crucial points to be faced for human emancipation, which passes for female emancipation. In every class society, gender cleavage functions as yet another of mankind's hierarchical mechanisms to advance the products of the work of others. In bourgeois societies, apart from the exploitation of productive wage labor, which involves the exploitation of both men and women working, housework is reaffirmed as an activity that specifically subjects women to inferiority, both in society and within any family nucleus. No matter how much the productive forces advance, with the permanence of the mode of human reproduction organized in the family nucleus, it falls to the woman most of the work to be performed.

The aim of this article is to present the debate, the demands and the measures that were taken immediately after the workers' takeover of the Russian Revolution to confront the issue of housework. In the debate on the modification of the family code, women claim the socialization of domestic work as one of the mechanisms to equalize, in terms of rights, the conditions of free and autonomous men and women. In the first place, we will make an assessment of what housework is in pre-capitalist class societies, their characteristics and the importance of women in this work. Second, we will analyze domestic labor for the capitalist economy, its relevance, and the way capital society views this type of work. Finally, we will present the measures that have been taken by the Russian revolutionaries to advance in this matter and at the same time, the movements of the society of capital that produce contradictory situations that allow the modification of housework . From the Marxist method, check to what extent a new reality is emerging from within the old mode of production.

**Angela Harutyunyan (American University of Beirut)**

***Periodizing the Soviet: The Advent of the Contemporary, and the Ghosts of Historical Time***

In recent debates, whether the contemporary is considered as an epochal notion, as a periodizing concept, a cultural logic or infrastructure of transnational capitalism, the advent of the contemporary is predominantly located in the moment of 1989, marked with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the USSR and the unprecedented globalization of capital. However, I argue that if considered from a Soviet historical and philosophical perspective, 1989 can be seen as an intensification of the contemporary that signals the convergence of two homologous temporalities: those of Stalinism and neoliberalism. Thus, the post-Soviet contemporary encapsulates the extended temporality of the disintegration of the revolutionary time of the Leninist project, the triumph of the Stalinist “regime of deadlines” and the “homogenous empty time” of post-Stalinist Soviet nationalism. The revolutionary time of the Leninist project is dealt with through the traces of its disintegration since Stalinism, as indexed in art and cultural politics, in the fate of dialectical materialism as a historical and philosophical method and system, and the institutionalization of post-Stalinist nationalism as the official opposition to the official Soviet discourse. Ultimately, the talk is a call for the periodization of the Soviet historical experience, one that both in the East and in the West is largely considered as a uniform totality, a conception that both complies with and reproduces the very logic of Stalinism.

**Gordana Jovanović (University of Belgrade)**

***Missed Revolutions in Psychology, Psychology for Revolution***

This paper examines Western psychological theories available after the October revolution and referring to that revolution, and analyses the influence of October revolution on the development of psychological theory of Lev Vygotsky in Soviet Union. Given the missed revolution in Germany in 1920s, an argument was advanced that Marxism, in the form known in 1920s, did not offer a proper theory of subjectivity. Frankfurt School as a Critical Theory of society founded on Marxism, turned to psychoanalysis as a theory of subjectivity which provides insights into dynamic, often pathological vicissitudes of drive forces faced with social demands. However, Freud's cultural pessimism did not allow for any possibility that a societal reform or revolution could overcome the inherent antinomy of individual and society. It was Wilhelm Reich who claimed that the necessity to prevent pathological consequences by radical societal changes follows from the very psychoanalytic insights into consequences of repression of drives. Neither Freud nor Reich lived in a revolutionary society – on the contrary they bitterly personally experienced the consequences of a missing or lost revolution. Lev S. Vygotsky, born in 1896, lived through the revolutionary change in Russia, accepted the new social and ideological project, took active part in post-revolutionary educational programs, and set as his goal to work toward a psychology of a new man for a new society. He adopted Marxism as a fruitful theoretical and methodological source for a new psychology and argued that psychology needs its „Capital“. At the same time he claimed that without the psychology as „the science of the new man“ Marxism would not be complete. He psychologically operationalized Marxist historical materialism offering cultural-historical theory of human development. Human development is mediated by historically produced symbolic tools that allow for self-regulation as lived freedom. Although Vygotsky's early death in 1934 prevented further elaboration of his theory, and in spite of recent attempts to deny its Marxist base, I would argue that Vygotsky's theory is a Marxist theory in its anthropological assumptions, in its socio-historical theorizing and in its sharing revolutionary goals – creating human beings capable of “mastery of our own being“. Vygotsky was explicit in his text „The socialist alteration of man“ (1930) that in order for humans to attain the „mastery of own being“, capitalist organization must be destroyed and „mastery of truth of society and society itself achieved“.

**Vladimir Ryzhkovsky (Georgetown University)**

***World History, Global History, and the Experience of the Russian Revolution***

**Pavel Arsenev (University of Geneve)**

***Language Revolution Between the Conscience of the Medium and Facts of Socialist Constructivism***

The shift of modernist art towards its own medium and its materiality intersected with the turn of modernist politics towards the industrial production of the masses at one particular point. This point can be designated as a moment of increasing of the *value of facts* – of interest both in the precise referential data and in the self-awareness of (the fact of) construction.

This stereoscopic twinning of almost mutually exclusive accents (on the moon itself and on the finger which shows on it, as mediologist would say) was already revealed in the first demands of the October Revolution to language transformation: this is the requirement of (class) consciousness in relation to one's own language and, as a consequence, the inventiveness of one's own speech and, at the same time, the requirement to subdue all the language procedures to the changing reality as such. From the very beginning of the October Revolution, every agent of language politics - from Trotsky to formalists - was maniacally struggling with the bureaucratization of the language and, as a consequence, the loss of perceptibility of the social processes themselves. However, the means to achieve a "natural" or desirable state of language ranged from populist methods (‘langue de peuple’) to linguo-constructivist. That just explains that the very revolutionized reality, i.e. facts themselves were understood as equally important with the language agency in their formation.

The paper examines the experience of "a rise to speak" or gaining the authorship (Benjamin) for a huge number of individuals previously deprived of this political and epistemological privilege. This experience is known as the movement of workers and rural correspondents or *literature of fact*. It was exactly in its practice that these two demands for the revolutionization of the language collided and interwoven: the introduction of *vox populi* into linguistic production and the spreading of the ambitions of innovative rationality to such peripheral genres as a productionist essay (*ocherk*) and a travel diary. The paper has a goal to describe specifically Soviet type of "terror in belles lettres" and the paradigm of the "revolution of language" as a whole, which associate the self-conscience of the medium with the most effective model of linguistic action.

**Anton Syutkin (Independent Researcher)**

***The Latest System-Programme of Soviet Dialectical Materialism:***  
***Mikhail Lifshits’s philosophical project and its consequences for the communist politics***

Mikhail Lifshits is primarily known as a controversial Soviet aesthetician, a violent critic of avant-garde and modernism. Despite this, during all his life he had considered himself as a philosopher. In his last years he had been working hard to complete his philosophical system, so called “ontognoseology”. This system had remained unfinished, but even its sketches show us the greatness of his project. In these sketches Lifshits was highly critical to the official Soviet dialectical materialism. He saw in it only the continuation of the Engelsian naturphilosophie, which illegally combined positivism and abstract dialectical laws. However, he was also skeptical about Western Neo-Marxist theories of a militant subject due to their total rejection of naturphilosophie. Lifshits elaborates an alternative version of Marxism, which rethinks the Soviet reflection-theory in a dialectical way as a theory of the nature’s and subject’s identity. As a materialist, Lifshits insists on the primacy of nature over the subject. Nevertheless, like a dialectician, he recognizes that this nature is not identical with itself. There are two natures: “big” nature, the creative totality of being, and “small” nature, the mechanical sum of particular entities. In ordinary state of things “big” nature inevitably disappears into the “small” one, but the difference between two natures still makes a room for the freedom of subject. The task of this subject in Lifshits’s dialectic is a reflection of the nature’s creative force; its salvation from the disappearance. This reflection realizes the identity of nature and subject and also the identity of nature with itself. Thus, Lifshits in his ontognoseology proposes the reconciliation of naturphilosophie and theory of subject. Furthermore, Lifshits transposes the matrix of his dialectics on the realm of the politics. Communism for him is nothing other than absolute democracy: a society that has achieved identity with itself. Unfortunately, democracy always declines into liberal atomization. From this perspective revolution does not deny democracy; conversely, the revolution separates democracy from liberalism and allows it to come to itself. According to Lifshits, revolution has the protective meaning, but not destructive one. In contemporary debates aporias of naturphilosophie and theory of the subject, on the one hand, and democracy and communism, on the other hand, are obstinately reproduced. The philosophical legacy of Lifshits, probably, indicates to the way of resolving these aporias and, therefore, calls for special attention today.

**Maria Kochkina (Independent Researcher)**

***“We will meet again, Jean!”: on the triumph of the lost time***

**Boris Kolonitsky (EUSP)**

***The Cultural Hegemony of the Socialists in the Russian Revolution and the Idea of the World Revolution***

February Revolution was depicted as bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic revolution by different political actors. However this term itself demonstrated the influence of the Socialist political language. The cultural hegemony of the Socialists composed a very important political context and it created an important resource for radical forces. In my paper I’ll try to trace how different political conflicts demonstrate this hegemony. I’ll show how the idea of the World Revolution was used, developed and legitimized by different actors during these conflicts.

**Alexander Reznik (HSE)**

***Lev Trotsky: writing auto/biographies, making revolution***

Leon Trotsky was not only an outstanding writer and speaker amongst Marxist politicians of his time but he can also be named as one of the most well-known (auto)biographers. Not only “politics” distinguished him from other high-ranking Bolsheviks, including Stalin, but also culture. Many of Trotsky’s rivals accused him of being extremely “individualistic”, and that was a particularly effective strategy for presenting him as alien to collectivist ideology. Looking at Trotsky’s biographical narratives in their complexity, however, “individualism” may indeed be a correct characterization, as Trotsky did emphasize the role of real persons, including his own, in history. Until recently, scholarly treatments of this issue have largely examined Trotsky’s autobiography, “My life: An Attempt at an Autobiography” (1930). Yet this celebrated book had a specific background. My aim is to re-evaluate Trotsky’s literary and political activity in the context of his numerous (auto)biographical texts from 1900 onwards, as well as to reveal his contribution to the making of texts devoted to him. As I will show, Trotsky followed his conception of historical writing, which had roots in pre-revolutionary Russian and Western European culture.

**Alexander Shubin (RSUH)**

***Power of Soviets: Theory and Practice in 1917-1918***

***Власть Советов: теория и практика в 1917-1918 гг.***

Революция, начавшаяся в 1917 г., сразу приобрела глубокий социальный характер, вовлекла в процесс социального творчества широкие массы, создала разнообразные структуры самоорганизации, прежде всего Советы. Идея Советов как классовых органов, непосредственно отражавших мнение миллионов людей, противостояла идее парламентаризма как периодической выборности народных представителей. Однако на практике и Советы не отражали мнение простых люде непосредственно – это тоже была определенная система представительства. По поводу ее достоинств и недостатков, возможностей сочетания с парламентаризмом велись дискуссии, закончившиеся установлением Советской власти, то есть власти, действовавшей от имени Советов. Однако на местах Советы действительно получили реальную власть (в некоторых населенных пунктах, как в Кронштадте и Гуляй-поле например, это произошло до Октябрьского переворота). Анализ практики управления Советов позволяет нам отделить идею Советов и миф Советов от реальных возможностей и последствий их управления, которое осуществлялось на деле в конце 1917 – первой половине 1918 гг. и затем стало вытесняться вертикальными административными структурами Советской власти.

**Keti Chukhrov (RSUH)**

***Who Makes Revolution in the Age of Speculative Design***

Contemporary theories of social emancipation claim that it is time to dispense with the concept of revolution and leave it merely as the legacy of political struggles belonging to the age of industrial economy. Globalization, semiocapital, speculative design, cryptoeconomy and artificial intelligence would engage epistemologically and ontogenetically different emancipatory lexicons and techniques of resistance. Accellerationist manifesto (Srnicek/Williams), xenofeminism, (Hester), theories on post-capitalist cooperation and commons (Frase, Rifkin), post-network stack and speculative infrastructure (Bratton), post-political consolidation of cognitive workers in expropriating general intellect from global capital (Bifo Berardi) – all these new futurisms infer the technological solutions for the hitherto political stakes. What remains nevertheless unheeded in them is cognitive equality and social continuity with the masses in constructing the collective subject of emancipation. The recent results of votes in the US, UK, Eastern Europe, Russia diagnose such cognitive rupture between the producers of emancipatory lexicons and the disenfranchised workers. In this connection the more so important is to reconsider the obliterated bond between communism and humanism (early Marx), the necessity of proletariat’s revolutionary dictatorship (Lenin) as well as the post-revolutionary outcomes of the non-surplus economy in the former SU.

**Ilya Kalinin (SPSU)**

***Counterrevolutionary Paradox of Cultural Revolution***

The interplay between Cultural Revolution that unfolded during the first fifteen years of Soviet rule and the political revolution, which results it actually sought to solidify, was always very complex. The quality of this relationship changed over time yet the nature of it remained largely the same. At the core of this tension lies an attempt to work out such mechanisms of forging new subjectivity (producing new type of subject, “new Soviet man”) that could allow to align *revolution* as a ‘fait accompli’ and a *man*, who was to become the main inheritor of this event, capable to transform revolutionary energy into the building of new life. The social-cultural space between *“*man*”* and *“*revolution*”* contained different scenarios for symbolic synchronization between socialist revolution and soviet subject. The major poles of this space were on one hand the endorsement of *revolution* not only in the social sphere but also in the sphere of culture, and on the other hand, the comprehension of the *revolution results* as of the necessity to ensure the acquired social hegemony by appropriating the authoritative cultural forms of the historical past.

The social liberation of the oppressed resulting in acquiring new political rights also transformed them into objects of cultural politics requiring to correspond to the newly established norms of *“*political literacy*”* (*politicheskaja gramotnost’*), *“*culturedness*”* (kulturnost’), and *"*consciousness*"* (*soznatel’nost*'). The state of workers and peasants found itself in a paradoxical situation. Not only it had to initiate a large scale program of Cultural Revolution that sought to re-establish a rational rule over the territories and people and to include huge social masses as its new agents. But it simultaneously had to radically modernize *itself* and to produce its own subjectivity though the self-directed extra-effort of self-renovation. The cult of the state self-transformation parallels such important social practices of the epoch as *self*-education, *self-*control, *self*-critique and so on. Such *“*turning towards oneself*”*, and the transformation of man not only into object of cultural politics but also into subject working on its self-transformation – was one of the main features of Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Cultural Revolution was initiated in the context of social liberation where the newly acquired class hegemony of the formerly oppressed became possible through familiarization with the cultural norms and achievements of the former oppressors. If before they could consider the *“*high*”* bourgeois culture as alien and resist to few reluctant attempts of its imposition, after the revolution they became its new owners who had to *join the rights of inheritance and to interiorize its forms and language*. The appropriation of the cultural forms of the past resulted in abandoning revolutionary stances, which was at the same time paradoxical and inevitable. In such a way Cultural Revolution turned out to be a counterrevolutionary regeneration of cultural forms of *Ancien Régime.*

My presentation will be focused on the debates between different programs of Cultural Revolution (most of all, LEF and RAPP ones), revealing the social-cultural mechanisms that led to the reproduction of previous forms of social hegemony through the reproduction of previous cultural and esthetical forms.

**Richard Bessel (University of York)**

***1917-2017: The Revolutionary Wave and Europe’s Century of Violence***

The Russian Revolution of 1917 may have been relatively bloodless, but it occurred in the context of the bloodshed of the First World War and precipitated an era of violence the like of which Europe had not seen for more than a century.  This talk aims to examine the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary violence, and the explosion of ethnic violence, during the years from 1917 roughly to 1923, and to explore its longer-term consequences.  It explores the relationship between the extraordinarily violent period roughly between the outbreak of the First World War and the immediate aftermath of the Second, on the one hand, and the remarkably peaceful second half of Europe’s twentieth century, on the other.  This contrast, it will be argued, has helped to shape attitudes in contemporary Europe and our understandings of the revolutionary wave from 1917 to 1923.

**Oleg Kharkhordin (EUSP)**

***Could the Communist revolution be a re-formation of the practices of belief?***

Revolution is not only a change in the political and/or social order, it is also a change in heart. I mean here that the Russian revolution of 1917 ushered in a new mass way in which people started to analyse their feelings, desires, wants and inner selves. Some scholars suggested that in a sense Russian revolution was akin to a Protestant reformation in that in reformed the practices of self-cognition and self-fashioning. My contention is that the Russian revolution produced a specific individual because it relied on the practices of self-cognition and self-fashioning different from Western Christianity: instead of (auricular) confessional practices that in the West were re-formed and radicalised by Luther and Calvin, in Eastern Christianity these were the (largely silent) penitential practices, radicalised and reformed by the Bolsheviks. The end result was an individual, but different from the Western one. It relied on the analysis of visible deeds, as performed by a relevant community, with this model being firmly rooted in the early Christianity of such figures as St. Jerome and Tertullian. Thus Communist revolution in its everyday practice was not about the cult of personality but rather about cultivating each separate personality, with this process leading to the rampant individualism of the post-1991 days.

**Gal Kirn (Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry)**

***Awakening of October revolution: from Lazarus to Vertov***

The lecture shall deal with what I term “revolutionary cinefication”, which is an understanding of continuation of October revolution *with other*, filmic and cinematic, *means* (Pavle Levi). To depart from the specificity of encounter between revolutionary politics and cinematic communism means to go beyond a mere representation of revolution (as matter, Protazanov) and the chosen three film figures were pivotal in making film “in a revolutionary mode” (Eisenstein). Obviosuly, film was given the major role in the building of socialism, this is why there was a largest cinematic campaign in human history that carried the name – cinefication – and that went hand in hand with electrification. However, I will be interested how especially Vertov and Medvedkin invented different modality of cinefication, how the experiments with cinema-train invented new forms of cinematic production and distribution, which pushed forward revolutionary process. Lastly, the lecture shall address despite some differences between these three figures also stress one convergence: the emergence of new – revolutionary – subjectivity within/beyond the film.

**Igor Chubarov (University of Tyumen)**

***Evidence and Violence: Factography Evolution from the Avant-garde to the Absurd and Camp Prose (Walter Benjamin, Bertold Brecht, Sergey Tretyakov, Andrey Platonov and Varlam Shalamov)***

Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings ironically state in the Benjamin’s bibliography that the philosopher combined the left political orientation with an explicitly bourgeois affection for high-end restaurants that was a feature of social democrats within his circle who “maintain a resolutely radical intellectual position while retaining, even amid great poverty, the accouterments of bourgeois life” ("Walter Benjamin. A Critical Life, p. 221). Thus Benjamin did not feel much comfort in Moscow in 1926. In his turn S.M. Tretyakov though being in “bourgeois” Berlin bars, where he was taken by Brecht at the beginning of the 30s, felt himself uncomfortable by blaming Stammtischpolitik and free morals: “They kissed so freely in the public eye in restaurants as if it was in a deep forest” (“People of One Fire”).  The exclusion technique (V-Effekt) of Brecht’s theatre was aimed in this sense at the contradiction revealing, but unfortunately not its abolition because own bourgeoisness recognition does not guarantee its overcoming. Therefore German friends envied Tretyakov so much – “the person of the direct action”. Having lasted till he got into Lubyanka. It was Shalamov who was the “luckiest” in the chain to perfect the factography technique – in Kolyma. The report is dedicated to the analysis of this literary factographic tradition.

**Tomáš Glanc (University of Zurich)**

***The Russian Revolution in Pavel Pepperstein’s Work and Potential for Psychedelic Revolution Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow***

***Русская революция 1917 года в творчестве Павла Пепперштейна и потенциал психоделической революции вчера, сегодня и завтра.***

В докладе ставится вопрос о взаимоотношении психоделической революции в художественной и интеллектуальной (насколько их можно различать как две самостоятельные категории) практике Павла Пепперштейна и Инспекции медицинская герменевтика с одной стороны -- и большевистской или социалистической революции со стороны другой. Первое обстоятельство такого рассуждения бросающееся в глаза -- это относительно небольшое дискурсивное значение революции 1917 г.  не только для Пепперштейна, но в концептуализме вообще -- особенно в сопоставлении с мифологией и семиотикой второй мировой войны, фашизма/нацизма и с идеологемами брежневского периода. Дальше рассматриваются разновидности в творчестве Пепперштейна революции как смены парадигм -- включая вопрос конца советского строя и начала постсоветской эпохи. Источниками конкретных примеров является как текстовой корпус работ Пепперштейна и Инспекции медицинская герменевтика, в первую очередь это конволют текстов "Пустотный канон", а также некоторые произведения изобразительного искусства, например цикл картин, посвященных Ленину (2014).

**Slavoj Žižek (University of Ljubljana)**

***Like a Thief in the Night: The Actuality of Communism***

How will radical social transformation happen? Definitely not as a triumphant victory or even catastrophe widely debated and predicted in the media but “like a thief in the night”: “[For](http://biblehub.com/greek/1063.htm) [you](http://biblehub.com/greek/846.htm) know very well [that](http://biblehub.com/greek/3754.htm) [the day](http://biblehub.com/greek/2250.htm) [of the Lord](http://biblehub.com/greek/2962.htm) [will come](http://biblehub.com/greek/2064.htm) unexpectedly, [like](http://biblehub.com/greek/5613.htm) [a thief](http://biblehub.com/greek/2812.htm) [in](http://biblehub.com/greek/1722.htm) [the night.](http://biblehub.com/greek/3571.htm) While people are saying, ‘Peace and security,’ destruction will come upon them suddenly, like labor pains on a pregnant woman, and they will not escape.”(Paul, 1 *Thessalonians* 5:2-3) Is this not already happening in our societies obsessed with, precisely, “peace and security”? The paradox of our predicament is that, while resistances against global capitalism seem to fail again and again to undermine its advance, they remain strangely out of touch with many trends which clearly signal capitalism’s progressive disintegration – it is as if the two tendencies (resistance and self-disintegration) move in different ontological levels and cannot meet, so that we get futile protests in parallel with immanent decay and no way to bring the two together in a coordinated act of capitalism’s emancipatory overcoming. How did it come to this? While (most of) the Left desperately tries to protect the old workers’ rights against the onslaught of global capitalism, it is almost exclusively the most “progressive” capitalists themselves (from Elon Musk to Mark Zuckenberg) who talk about post-capitalism – as if the very topic of passage from capitalism as we know it) to a new post-capitalist order is appropriated by capitalism… What would a Leninist gesture be in such a new predicament? One thing is sure: while Communist revolutions were grounded in a clear vision of historical reality (“scientific socialism”), its laws and tendencies, so that, in spite of all its unpredictable turn, the revolution was fully located into this process of historical reality, in his practice, Lenin was effectively acting as the captain of a vessel lost in a stormy sea, finding its way in an uncharted territory – and this is the stance we need today more than ever.

**Sami Khatib (Leuphana University of Lüneburg)**

***No Future: Revolution and Melancholy***

The historical horizon separating 1917 and 2017 is split between a past communism of the future and a lost future of the past. Acknowledging this split, the paper takes its cue from current debates on the connection of collective memory, revolutionary politics and (post)historical historicization. The political act of criticizing “left-wing melancholy” (W. Benjamin, 1931) or affirming a transformative “culture of defeat” (E. Traverso, 2016) can be read as symptoms of the same conjuncture: the loss of the future, aptly framed as the “Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” (Jameson, 1984) and “Capitalist Realism” (M. Fisher, 2009). Memorizing the October Revolution in 2017 demonstrates the unbridgeable gap between a past “space of experience” and the contemporary “horizon of expectation” (R. Koselleck, 2004). In terms of Walter Benjamin’s famous “Angel of History,” our posthistorical gaze seems melancholically fixated on a catastrophic past, unable to complete a constructive work of mourning, forever stuck in a loop of commemorating a lost past that never existed in the first place. Without repeating the gesture of “Resisting Left Melancholy” (W. Brown, 1999) once more, the paper takes the split between the current capitalist (posthistorical) space of experience and past (historical) horizons of expectation as its starting point to investigate the constructive dimension of a political present with “no future.”

**Rebecca Comay (University of Toronto)**

***Revolution and Tragedy***

**Yoel Regev (EUSP)**

***Time-dj: opti-mix and interrupted revolution***

**Ти-джеинг: сведение времени и прерванная революция.**

Проблема радикальной трансформации временных рядов, включающей в себя возможность ретро-активного изменения прошлого и перемещения между взаимонесовозможными мирами, является одной из главных тем современной массовой культуры. В то же время, анализ актуальной экономической ситуации, осуществляемый Жан-Пьером Дюпуи, и рефлексия Славоя Жижека о суверенности и сексуальность позволяют утверждать, что фигура «временной петли» и «самоосуществляющегося пророчества» представляют собой онтологический и экономический базис актуальной ситуации в целом. Капитализм - это победа над временем. Однако буржуазная революция остается прерванной революцией и реорганизация временных рядов продолжает носить пассивный и отчужденный характер: мы сами ежесекундно создаем собственное прошлое, настоящее и будущее, но мы не в состоянии что-либо в этом процессе изменить. В лекции будет предложена онтологическо-экономическая позиция, продолжающая базисные интуиции лейбницианской и кантовской философии и позволяющая завершить революцию Нового Времени благодаря спекулятивной интервенции, утверждающей реальность совпадения. Центром лекции будет фигура ти-джея - революционного субъекта, активно осущевствляющего нарезку и сведение темпоральных рядов.

**Bernard Aspe (International College of Philosophy)**

***Conflict of times***

We are in a world where the very idea of ​​political revolution seems anachronistic. We have learned to think that if there were still to be revolutions, they could only be technological, or economic. This supposed evidence is imposed by what may be called the world of capital. This world has its own temporality. What he seeks to eliminate is precisely a political temporality that would escape his grasp.

It is then necessary to start again from what can positively contain the very idea of ​​anachronism. Or rather, as Ranciere indicates, the idea that there are anachronies. The time of history is never contemporaneous with itself: there are always several times in "the" time. There is, for example, a time which is that of the world of capital - whose symbol is the "real time" of the planetary connection. And there is a very different time, that of egalitarian politics, which is built by keeping away from the injunctions of the world of capital. Let us note that it is only from [and not since] that time that the question of the legacy of past revolutions may arise.

The time of capital and revolutionary time can only enter into conflict. The question then is: what is the time of the confrontation of heterogeneous times? What is the proper time of the conflict? If the term "revolution" is necessary, is it not precisely because it makes it possible to designate the time within which the conflict of heterogeneous temporalities takes place?

I will rely mainly on the analyzes of Jacques Rancière, but also on the description of the processes of individuation as conceived by Gilbert Simondon.

***Anachronies***

Nous sommes dans un monde où l'idée même de révolution politique paraît anachronique. Nous avons appris à penser que s'il devait encore y avoir des révolutions, elles ne pourraient être que d'ordre technologique, ou économique. Cette évidence supposée est imposée par ce que l'on peut appeler le monde du capital. Ce monde a une temporalité qui lui est propre. Ce qu'il cherche à éliminer, c'est précisément une temporalité politique qui échapperait à ses prises.

Il faut alors repartir de ce que peut contenir de positif l'idée même d'anachronisme. Ou plutôt, comme l'indique Rancière, l'idée qu'il existe des anachronies. Le temps de l'histoire n'est jamais contemporain de lui-même : il y a toujours plusieurs temps dans "le" temps. Il y a par exemple un temps qui est celui du monde du capital - dont le symbole est le "temps réel" de la connexion planétaire. Et il y a un temps, bien différent, qui est celui de la politique égalitaire, qui se construit en tenant à distance les injonctions du monde du capital. Notons que c'est seulement depuis ce temps que peut se poser la question de l'héritage des révolutions passées.

Le temps du capital et le temps révolutionnaire ne peuvent qu'entrer en conflit. La question est alors : quel est le temps de la confrontation des temps hétérogènes ? Quel est le temps propre du conflit ? Si le terme "révolution" est nécessaire, n'est-ce pas précisément parce qu'il permet de désigner le temps au sein duquel s'opère le conflit des temporalités hétérogènes ?

Je m'appuierai essentiellement sur les analyses de Jacques Rancière, mais aussi sur les description des processus d'individuation tels que les conçoit Gilbert Simondon.

**Gigi Roggero (University of Bologna)**

***The Train Against the History***

In my presentation I will try to analyze the Bolshevik 1917 stressing a double perspective: the *actuality of the revolution*, and the *inactuality of the rupture*. The actuality means the possibility of the revolution in a contemporary world where it was erased, or it was subsumed in the concept of capitalist innovation; the inactuality of the rupture is a Nietzschean assertion, that is to say, the aptitude to act on the present time, against the present time, and for a time to come. In other words, the Bolshevik revolution was a revolution against the Marxist idea of History, i.e. the objective necessity to go through the capitalist stages of development waiting for the Socialist one. To clarify this thesis, we will use the metaphor of the train. As it is well known, in the April of one century ago Lenin and other revolutionaries travelled on a plunged wagon to come back in Petrograd. That train travelled not only through the History and the World War, but also against the History, to make the rupture where – following the Marxist orthodoxy – was not the place, and when was not the time. In fact, we have to remind that the “April Theses ”were fought not only by the Menshevik and other socialist groups, but also by a certain part of the central committee of Bolshevik Party. Lenin was a minority, and he was took as crazy. So the train, that is a symbol of capitalist development, is here overthrown to make a revolutionary interruption of this development, i.e. to open another line of counter-development. Retracing the mysterious curve of Lenin’s straight-line (since the polemic with narodniki until the debate on the role of the unions in 1920-1921, analyzing the flexible relationship between the party and the soviet, between organization and spontaneity), I will try to show the materialist foundation of the revolutionary will that is the key of his political action. And that is the key of every revolutionary action that tries to re-conquest the ability to dream.

**Alexei Penzin (University of Wolverhampton)**

***Towards the Infinite: the Speculative Side of Late Soviet Philosophy and the Idea of Communism***

The paper will discuss – against the stereotypical and normalized perspectives – the radical and speculative character of the late Soviet thought. Paradoxically, being formed in the state, which has been established by militant materialism, and being Marxist and materialist itself, this thought asked questions about ontological status of the ideal. I will elucidate two crucial paradigms of this questioning – Ewald Ilyenkov's "Cosmology of the Spirit" related to his later work on the concept of the ideal, and Mikhail Lifshitz’s project of "onto-epistemology" (“onto-gnoseologia”), which argues that reflective and proto-cognitive elements are part of non-human world itself. Both thinkers keep fidelity to the October Revolution and to Lenin as its central theoretical and practical figure. They do so in considering the cosmological destiny of the universe in the view of Leninist interventionism (Ilyenkov), or – through an ambitious critique of “vulgar materialism” – in advancing the idea of communism that would restore the capacity of materialist thought to become an infinite “speculum mundi” (Lifshitz). Relying on these paradigms, I will argue that the main questions of late Soviet philosophy are about materialist conception of the ideal and, implicitly, about relations the finite and the infinite. Moreover, both thinkers conceive communism as a threshold, enabling transition from the finite (and the socially determined) to the infinite. In today's capitalist world, dominated by the ideology of "democratic materialism" (Alain Badiou) that blocks thinking on both communism and the infinite, the ideas of late Soviet thought have a chance for revival – as a radical challenge for existing critical theories and political practices.

**Andreas Kalyvas (New School for Social Research)**

***The Paradox of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat: The Revolution as a State of Exception***

With the occasion of the Russian Revolution and the Bolshevik seizure of power in October 1917, I revisit the Marxist-Leninist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the form of a paradox that unfolds in two separate but interrelated registers. The first refers to the historical origins of the ancient Roman concept and institution of dictatorship as an aristocratic invention designed and deployed against plebeian struggles. The second points to its political logic that centers around the aim of restoring the order of the state in the face of sedition, factional strife, and insurrection. These two constitutive attributes of the classical definition and operation of dictatorship were overturned in the Marxist-Leninist doctrine whereby dictatorship was transformed into a proletarian class instrument in the hands of the modern plebeians against their plutocratic masters and exercised for the revolutionary institution of a stateless society. This double reversal became possible by converting the emancipatory idea of revolution into a state of emergency that displaced the extraordinary with the exception. Hence, the paradox of the dictatorship of the proletariat can be described in terms of a ‘reason de revolution’ and redefined as a special political rationality, a new technique of revolutionary governmentality, in accordance with which the exercise of power is freed from all constraints for the purpose of eliminating the enemies of the revolution, overcoming the previous order of things, and of bringing about an entirely new order.

**Lorenzo Chiesa (Genoa School of Humanities)**

***The State As Revolution***

A close, unbiased, and anti-anarchic reading of Lenin’s writings and speeches of 1917-1923 leads to an unequivocal conclusion; the proletarian revolution that – almost instantaneously – dissolves the bourgeois state is to be followed by the establishment of a transitional socialist state leading to communism. The socialist state is closely associated yet not identical with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat as a gradual – and on close inspection perhaps asymptotic – withering away of the state as such. The socialist state dialectically undoes itself precisely through its consolidation thanks to a new and emancipatory form of biopolitics (for instance, by implementing the principle according to which “all shall become ‘bureaucrats’ for a time […] so that, therefore, no one can become a ‘bureaucrat’”). However, the state also seems always to survive in some residual and thoroughly reconfigured form. At times Lenin even ventilates the possibility of a communist – that is, not merely socialist – state. This paper aims at analysing the theory and praxis of the socialist-communist transitional state as envisioned by Lenin, and at assessing the philosophical and political temporality of this transition, by focusing on Lenin’s writings and speeches following the October Revolution, which most often concern pressing military, economical, administrative, if not biopolitical matters. I will show how they consistently adhere to the theory of the state advanced in The State and Revolution and, in turn, in Marx’s The Critique of the Gotha Programme. In this light, I will also focus on how Lenin’s concern with what he himself calls a transitional management of “human resources” is consonant with the philosophical anthropology presupposed by Marx’s own project.

**Maria Chehonadskih (Kingston University London)**

***The ‘Epistemological Break’ of the post-Revolutionary Soviet Thought: Knowledge, Critique and Organization***

 The paper proposes a critical reassessment of the Soviet Marxism from the epistemological point of view. I argue that a post-revolutionary Soviet logic assumes that theory should start where Marx ended and that it should *act* in a Marxist fashion across all conceptual and practical realms. In this respect a revolutionary rupture with the past can be treated in terms of  a ‘epistemological break’ and what I name a *post-critical status of thinking* that must embrace the theory of communism and rethink past systems in this respect. Instead of asking ‘how’ (to criticise, to approach, to understand) the Soviet thought returns to the old pre-critical question of ‘what is’ (matter, language, body, thinking) and reformulate this ‘what is’ in Marxist post-critical terms. The purpose here is not merely clarification of knowledge through guiding method or discipline, but rather reformulation of knowledge or ‘the communist deciphering of world relations’ (Dziga Vertov). The work of deciphering proposes experimental models of writing and conceptualising, which blur the threshold where philosophy begins and literature ends or where politics starts and philosophy stops.

**Marina Simakova (EUSP)**

***Toward Passive Revolution and Back***

The concept of “passive revolution” is largely associated with the theoretical legacy of Antonio Gramsci and its reception across the world. Among other things, it signifies transformation of the dominant order, which results out of successful absorption of the revolutionary impulses in the period of crisis or war. Conceived in a dialectical way, passive revolution implies a play of antithetical forces; it is ‘revolution-restoration’ with the decisive predominance of the latter. Representing gradual change *from above*, passive revolution reveals the lack of popular initiative, as well as a state of weakness, division, and melancholy of the left. While Gramsci deployed this concept to describe political configurations of Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, similar processes of reactionary transition – if not their intensification – may be indicated in the contemporary era. These processes expose the fundamental endurance of capitalism being able to heal its cracks, relieve its inner tensions and therefore constantly suspend the moment of its historical rupture. At the same time, the framework of the passive revolution could be inverted in order to describe a relevant strategy of resistance, which was recently demonstrated by Hardt and Negri who advocated a social change *from within*. This paper contrasts two respective approaches to the concept, exposing “revolutionary” and “restorationary” features in each particular case.

**Karthick Ram Manoharan (Center for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta)**

***The State and Revolution: Reading Lenin with Öcalan***

Lenin was the first great thinker in the pantheon of Marxist intellectuals to give the state due theoretical importance. *The State and Revolution,* Lenin’s pamphlet on the nature of the state and relation of the proletarian party to the same, is considered a key text in Marxist theories of the state. Building on Marx’s account of the Paris Commune, and controversially deploying the term ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, Lenin makes a compelling case for the working class to wield state power as a strategic necessity, albeit temporarily. He dismisses the arguments of reformists for diluting the concrete revolutionary slogan for a proletarian dictatorship and equally condemns the anarchists who wanted an immediate abolition of the state for their utopianism. Lenin’s hardnosed realism as regards capturing and wielding state power nevertheless drifts into vague abstractions when it comes to his arguments on the withering away of the state. Several critics have accused the Leninist approach to the state for its alleged totalitarian tendencies. This paper critically revisits the Leninist theory of the state by engaging with the works of Abdullah Öcalan.

Öcalan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), is the central intellectual and political figure in the Kurdish movement. Öcalan’s writings have provided a solid ideological plank for the Kurdish struggle, influencing not just the PKK which has been fighting Turkey for greater autonomy since 1978, but also Kurdish militant groups in Northern Syria fighting the Islamic State. Beginning his insurgent career as a Marxist-Leninist, Öcalan evolved a Nietzschean critique of state power. He believes that states, bourgeois and socialist alike, are inherently oppressive. While oppressed groups might have a legitimate claim to form states of their own, even such newly formed states only serve to replace one form of domination with another, becoming fertile grounds for xenophobic nationalism, sexism and/or religious fundamentalism. He proposes democratic confederalism, a system of governance that would be based on collective consensus and voluntary participation, as an alternative to the centralized state. In this paper, I bring Öcalan’s critique of the state and his advocacy for the distribution of power to the peripheries to look at Lenin’s defense of a centralized workers’ state. I conclude that the success of the ‘Kurdish model’ in Northern Syria should encourage us to look at democratic confederalism as an alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

**Alla Ivanchikova (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)**

***The Road to Moscow Leads through Kabul: The “Future” of One Minor Revolution***

What does it mean to speak of revolution in a non-revolutionary, yet radicalized era? What does it take to commemorate a revolution that has been defeated? In his *Left-Wing Melancholia*, Enzo Traverso writes: “The ghosts haunting Europe today are not the revolutions of the future but the defeated revolutions of the past” (20). In my new book (currently awaiting publication), I examine the contested legacies of the last communist revolution of the 20th century—the Saur (April) revolution in Afghanistan in 1978, in which the Afghan communist party (PDPA) came to power. Hafizullah Amin, one of the party leaders, addressed the young crowd in Kabul by proclaiming: “revolutions are the festivals of the oppressed and the exploited. In no other time except the time of revolution, are the masses in the position to actively go ahead as creators of a new social regime. In such time people can make miracles.” In this speech, Amin envisions the revolution as a world-making event—the opening of the possibilities that, prior to that, could only be imagined. This revolution was quickly defeated; today, the Afghan socialist history is inscribed in history books and the popular imaginary as nothing but a ruin. I my talk, I engage with Traverso’s claim by recovering the anticipatory promise of the 1978 communist revolution in Afghanistan, while at the same time problematizing his focus on Europe as the privileged locus of revolutionary activity. I also claim the centrality of the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan: to paraphrase Trotsky’s famous claim, “the road to Paris leads through Beijing and Calcutta,” the road to the defeat of the 1917 October Revolution lead through the mountain ranges of 1980s Afghanistan. I then outline what I call the three figures of defeat that have been deployed strategically to position a communist revolution in Afghanistan—and other communist revolutions—as nothing but an act of ruination. These three figures are: revolution as rape (leaving behind ruined bodies); revolution as an assault of nature (ruined natures); and revolution as genocidal (ruined peoples). In 2017, the historical moment characterized by the persistence of Left-wing melancholia, capitalist realism, and the cooptation of “Leninisms” by right-wing anti- statist political actors, it is more important than ever to come back to, reassess, and reaffirm the global value of not only October 25, 1917, but the revolutions that it inspired.

**Javlon Boymat (OSCE Academy)**

***The Centennial of the 1917 Russian Revolution and the Post-Soviet Space: Narratives from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia***

The main focus of the Thesis is to identify the attitude of people and governments in the post- Soviet countries of Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia towards events that took place one hundred years ago, i.e. – the Russian Revolution of 1917, – and explore what those events mean today for the citizens of these countries. Using the theory of collective memory as its main theoretical framework, the Thesis tries to determine, on the one hand, the way people in those three former Soviet republics remember, reconstruct, and interpret the 1917 events, and on the other hand, the positions and modes of narration of the ruling elites in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia. In addition, the Thesis attempts to identify similarities and differences in narrations among intellectuals of the 1917 events that developed in the years that followed the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

**José Neves (Nova University of Lisbon)**

***Against and Within our Liberal Condition: Towards Another History of 20th Century Communism***

For many liberal historians, the 20th century was characterised by a fundamental opposition between the values and practices of liberty and the totalitarian models of power implemented by fascists as well as communists. While this anti-totalitarian historiography has been sharply criticized by many other historians, in this paper we would like to take a step further and focus on how communism as a political culture has inscribed itself in the constitution of our current modern liberal societies. If we can easily establish major political disagreements between communists and liberals, we can also grasp the ways they have shared forms of endorsing, imagining and practicing power. To put it bluntly: communism must be historically recognized not only as being against our modern liberal condition but also within it. This genealogical hypothesis will inspire us while analysing some relevant remains of 20th century communism, from the headquarters of the French Communist Party in Paris, designed by Brazilian architecture Oscar Niemeyer in the 1960’s, to the manuals of militant conduit written by Álvaro Cunhal, the historical leader of the Portuguese Communist Party. The study of these elements will show the entanglement between the history of communism and some emergent topics of our liberal condition as it was defined in the awake of post-Fordism, namely those of transparency, lightness, flexibility, cooperation and creativity. This genealogical approach will give us a less dogmatic account of the history of our present liberal condition, an account less dependent on the ways liberals themselves imagine their own political identity, but it may also prove thoughtful to those of us committed to the idea of communism as revolution, as it forces them to consider both the limits and the possibilities of communism as emancipation from the present. On the one hand, and as for the possibilities, it has been argued by philosophers like Antonio Negri that communism is immanent to today’s capitalism and that achieving it means not only inventing new forms of life but also releasing existing ones from capitalist control; as for the limits, and now following the reasoning of Jacques Rancière or Alain Badiou, one must note that if communism already plays a constituent role in the current situation, it can hardly emerge as a radical alternative to that same situation.

**Kseniya Kapelchuk (Sociological Institute of the RAS)**

***Revolution and History: the Course of Repetition***

Described as a fundamental rupture and break of institutions and traditions, as an attempt to turn over the course of history revolution can be used rhetorically both as an image of the repression and as an image of the return of repressed. Revolution appears as an appeal to the new, but the new here can be interpreted also as the «immemorial past», return to which constitutes this very past. This ambivalence of the meaning of revolution can not be disregarded by critical theory for it is lying in the core of dialectical understanding of history.

The understanding of history as the universal history is not itself universal. Moreover, as R.Koselleck shows it is produced as a direct result of the very processes that gained the name of revolution. The event of the revolution is not something that interrupts some consistent and logical course of history, but something that in a sense sets these very historical coordinates. In this respect, if we compare the events of history with synchronous, but less tangible philological events of the conceptual history, then the process of exclusion and displacement can be localized not only at the level of the historical process, or at the level of the formation of concepts, but in the point where they touch upon each other and trigger the retroactive operation of sense-giving.

The concept of revolution originates from the Latin «revolutio», an astronomical term signifying the rotation of celestial bodies. In this sense it attests to the initial relationship between the revolutionary movement and repetitiveness of natural circularity, independent from the man's actions and subjected to a certain law. This meaning of the word was transferred from Latin into the spoken European languages. However later it took on a different, political significance. This process is often described as an emancipation of linearity of history: in its core we find the exclusion of the repetition and discovery of the space of novelty, in which historical event becomes possible. But the very name of revolution and the very character of revolutinary practices show us that repetition still determines its way. The paper states that the controversies of political meaning of revolution are strongly connected to the process of displacement and transformation of the notion of repetition.

**Anastasia Kalk (New School for Social Research)**

***Hannah Arendt: Revolutionary Nature***

From our subjective position, nature always orients towards the (thinking) human and is completely impossible without a relation to the world. In other words, nature is always already nature-in-the-world. Here the focus shifts from natural to human, and this is a crucial shift for Arendt. The category of natality, Arendt invention, keeps two sides together and plays the role of a bridge between infinite natural processes and human politics. Natality manifests itself two times: first in the event of human birth and second in a human (collective) political action. For Arendt, the term describes the situation where nature (by the fact of birth) infects a person with a potential to create her living conditions (history and politics) and new revolutionary beginnings. In other words, nature conditions human in the way that it primarily defines human as non-conditioning being (by injecting a capacity to action) with a lack of any external control (Arendt, 1998, p.11); Nature infects a wo/man with a capacity to form her conditions, including the ability to surmount/negate nature. Moreover, in my opinion, Arendt endows nature with a certain primacy over the history in the book Between Past and Future . It is precisely the idea of nature and human attitude towards it that, according to her, shape our understanding of history and revolutionary changes in a particular age. The category of nature precedes and specifies everything we call non-natural or historical; it affects human actions. Being a desirable alien object in the ancient times, “nature” provoked people to achieve the attribute they ascribed to nature. In this way, it intensified historical actions. Later, individuals introduced the whole sphere of “history” created on the model of nature and echoing its subjective image. History was invented to establish human-nature continuity and grant natural immortality to every person regardless of her actions. Finally, when the old ideas of nature could no longer be convincing, when all the previous illusions about nature’s immortality, independence, stability, and predictability were destroyed, thinkers endow the category with only one quality of creativity. And it is the same nature-like creativity and contingency that people are trying to reproduce through historical actions, beginning something new in a realm previously considered as unamenable and fixed.

**Vladislav Sofronov (Independent Researcher)**

***«Even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins". Walter Benjamin's political phenomenology of history and death and Nikolai Fyodorov’s "The Philosophy of the Common Task»***

In Benjamin's “Theses on the Philosophy of History” history is not "homogeneous, empty time", the time of a mechanically moving "progress". The past, according to Benjamin, is never "completed," it can be changed. The fate of the past depends on the activity ("weak Messianic power") of present and future generations. Even the defeat and death of the fighters of the past are not determined once and for all and can (and should) change. From this angle one must also look at the historical meaning and significance of the October Revolution - they are not yet defined and can not be determined in the foreseeable future. This, however, is quite clear. However, one rarely pay attention to the fact that the full deployment of the communist perspective presupposes an even "stronger" attitude to the past than Benjamin's (where such an attitude can be described as a whole by the category "retroactivity"). And such an even stronger attitude towards the past can be found from the founder of Russian cosmism Nikolai Fyodorov (part of whose ideas are quite consistent with a strictly materialistic and communist interpretation).

**Andrew Calp (California Institute of the Arts)**

***1917/2017: Stepping Outside Lenin's Shadow***

**Thomas Telios (University of St.Gallen)**

***Waiting for Godot: The Communist Subjectivity and the Politics of Collectiversalism***

There can be no (next) revolution without (re)working out a (new) revolutionary subject. At least this could be regarded as being partially the legacy of both the French and the October Revolution. Concerning particularly the legacy of the October Revolution, its legacy ought to be sought in the fact that it was a *virtually* holistic one in a sense that it aimed to manifest a total intervention cutting across every existing discourse. This was the practical-theoretical consequence of *The State and Revolution* (1917) that conclusively accomplished what was laid down since *What is to be done?* (1902). Given that both models – the universalist dispersion of the agency to the people as occurred in the French Revolution, as well as the condensation of the agency to a universal party as occurred in the October Revolution – have exhausted their historical role, the revolutionary practices of the future will have to extrapolate a new revolutionary subjectivity. My argument is that the latter consists in exerting holistic, collective strategies that acknowledge the necessity of communist – according to Jodi Dean’s clarification of this term (cf. *The Communist Horizon*, 2012) – politics. The latter demands the realization that the subject is a collective entity as Marx foresaw in his *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* when he declared the subject a “common being” to which subsequently no individualist politics can correspond.

I term the former *communist subjectivity* under which I understand a subject that is not just at the cross path of every existing way of production (as e.g. the intersectionalists would claim), but the collective product of all of them together, a *communist* – understood in the spirit of Jean-Luc Nancy (cf. *La comparution*, 1991) – construction that entails everything and knows no outside. For the latter, e.g. for the politics that lay ahead of this communist subjectivity, I introduce the notion of *collectiversalism* that entails, in a nutshell, following elements: (a) that there can be no politics of sectarianist “either... or...”, but of connective “both... as well...”; (b) that there can be no coincidental, arbitrary, decisionist politics, but politics of historicized responsibility; (c) that there can be no politics of particularist enactment, but of collective realization; (d) that there can be no freedom, but collective self-determination; (e) that such politics are the symptoms of a contingent necessity derived from the subject’s social production; (f) that there can only be a politics of infinity since the ways of the subject’s production are inexhaustible; (g) that those politics are tactics in a sense that they reshuffle the context in which the emerge and not strategies that need to mislead, subvert or erode; last but not least (h) that those politics entail struggle not out of ethical normative reasons, but as a social- ontological necessity immanent to the struggle of the different ways of production that brought forth the subject as a communist one. In my paper, I aim to shed some light to those elements in order to rethink the possibility of a revolution as being already at hand.

**Stephan Teichgräber (University of Vienna)**

***The concept of revolution of N.I. Bukharin***

The transition of Nikolai Ivanovich Bukharin from the left wing of the Bolshevik party to its right wing, perhaps, is best traced by the example of his idea of ​​what a revolution is. Moreover, such an inner-party position is rather attributed to him by others, it does not necessarily correspond to his personal vision of himself and, maybe, does not correspond to the facts. Vladimir Ilyich considered him an economist, not very versed in Marxism and politically unstable, while Bukharin was the leader of the Left Communists and the editor-in-chief of their newspaper Kommunist. The right-wing bias of Bukharin, about which Stalin openly declared as early as 1929, also testifies to the way of thinking of the latter to divide everyone into "right" and "left" - Bukharin here, and Trotsky there, rather than correspond to reality. Bukharin's rejection of dekulakization is difficult to define as a right or left point of view, although Iosif Vissarionovich could not explain his desire to protect the property of the kulaks differently than as a right position. For Bukharin, the new economic policy (NEP) was a continuation of the revolution and this is the most remarkable, even pointing to the future, Perestroika, while one can only assume that the continuation of the NEP would lead to such chaos as the Yeltsin's time. At the end of the twenties, that is, before the time of dekulakization, and just when Stalin announced his right deviation, Bukharin saw as the main task of the time the implementation of the cultural revolution, that is, he came from the idea of ​​a world revolution to the idea of ​​a cultural revolution in one country. Later, Mao Zedong misused this concept in personal interests, in order to secure his power at a very dangerous moment for him.

**Aaron Schuster (University of Amsterdam)**

***Love, Comedy, and Communism in Lubitsch's “Ninotchka”***

It would be easy enough to see Ernst Lubitsch's film Ninotchka (1939) as an anti-communist tale, where the cold, unfeeling Soviet emissary Ninotchka (Greta Garbo), sent to Paris on an important affair of state, ends up having a very different affair: she falls in love with a gigolo and learns how to stop worrying about the People and enjoy the charming luxuries of capitalist life (she even laughs!). I will show, on the contrary, how the best jokes in the film are actually directed against capitalism, and that Ninotchka remains faithful to the communist cause even as she abandons the model of bureaucratic socialism. The politics of Lubitsch's comedies, dealing with capitalism, communism, and fascism from the 1920s to the 1940s, will be discussed. In addition I will compare Ninotchka with the Bolshevik feminist Alexandra Kollontai (rumored to be the model for her character), looking at how Kollontai articulated a theory of comradeship-love.

**Jodi Dean (Hobart and William Smith Colleges)**

***Provisional Notes for a Theory of the Comrade***

**Oxana Timofeeva (EUSP)**

***Solidarity and Witchcraft***