this myth in more detail. This would help in outlining its artificiality. High-ranking Soviet intelligence advisors seem to have been instrumental in generating the fascist putsch/agent provocateur argument. Memories of National Socialism, concentration camps, and the Holocaust were crucial to the party’s depiction of the uprising as a fascist recrudescence. There were, it is true, several anticommu-

nist organizations operating in West Berlin, some staffed by former Nazis and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency, which expressed virulent hatred of the SED and called for a “Tag X.”

While Millington positions his book as a contribution to debates on “normalization,” it is much more a book about memory and memory management. The author painstakingly disentangles fiction from fact, genuine from mistaken memory. Although wise to the distorting effect of remembering, at times he could have been more criti-
cal of his interviewees. Here the weight of non-worker SED members is unfortunate. Arguably, there is no such thing as an untainted memory. Every vividly recalled de-
tail is shaped and influenced by what happened next. Millington recognizes the post-uprising smear campaign for what it was, but ignores some of its more laughable ele-
ments. Was it really possible (as the main party newspa-

per, Neues Deutschland, claimed) to tell Western infiltrators among the Stalinallee workers by their samba socks? Excessive moral panics can be artificially generated any-
where and the 1953 smear campaign fits into a wider his-
tory of misrepresentation and moral panic.

Although Millington makes clear that, at the time, older workers refused to recognize that they had been duped by provocateurs, he suggests that this version never-
thessence seeped into many people’s visions and recollec-
tions of the uprising. Although they did not entirely agree with the official version, participants and subsequent generations lacked the wherewithal concretely to dispute it. Although challenging theSED version, West German depic-
tions were equally skewed. Multiple conflicting ver-
sions reinforced a schizophrenic, two-faced (zweigleisig) approach to learning in schools. One former teacher’s recollection of how she approached the subject in class— “as briefly and painlessly as possible. Simply teach it, done, tick it off the list”—is highly revealing of the fail-
ures of such an overtly politicized education system (38). The lack of a free public sphere (in spite of Western me-
dia intrusion) meant that contradictions and ambiva-
lences were not resolved and no single collective memory of the uprising emerged (11).

Ultimately, Millington argues that, thanks to misinformation and the official tainting of memories, the uprising failed to have a major impact on subsequent expressions of opposition and unrest. The book suggests that eyewitnesses have less to tell us about the uprising itself than about the processes of spin that were subsequently ap-
plied to it. Here an account of how the authorities turned their depictions of the uprising into a moral panic about Western-influenced wayward youth would be interesting. With hindsight, it seems incredible that experienced workers could be presented as gullible dupes. However, shiny their bicycles or flashy their socks, there was no dis-
guising that this was a genuine expression of popular dis-
content with the way the party was directing society and the economy. The most painful aspect of the uprising was its failure: it offered a tantalizing but ultimately depress-
ing example of what might have been.

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IULIJA SAFRONOVA. Russkoe obschestvo v zerkale revol-

utsionnogo terrora, 1879–1881. (Historia Rossica.) Mos-

A new book on late-nineteenth-century (1879–1881) Rus-
sian populist revolutionary terror should be welcomed if only because the field has been stagnating for quite a while. Research on populist individual terrorism received its last strong impetus in the late 1980s due to the opening of the Russian archives and the post-Soviet enthusiasm for reevaluation of the Russian revolutionary past. By 2000 a few important collections of historical sources and new monographs had appeared in a number of languages, most notably in Russian and English, before the attention of scholars shifted to the more “modern” early-twentieth-

century terrorism and the Bolshevik and Stalinist terror. The latest, most original book-length study of the “first wave” of terrorism, in the nineteenth century, was Claudia Verhoeven’s The Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity, and the Birth of Terrorism (2009), and reflected the tendency of scholars to approach terrorism as a window onto something else, such as Russian modernity, elite and mass political culture, or gender regimes.

The book by Iuliia Safronova builds on this tendency by interpreting terrorism as a mirror of the modernizing post-reform Russian society. As she explains, when for-
mal institutions are underdeveloped, the population is split into semi-isolated social estates, and individual sub-
jects of the monarchy have neither political representa-
tion nor basic freedoms; the society as a whole can be seen only in a state of crisis. The first wave of terrorism, between 1879 and 1881, when the People’s Will terrorist organization staged a number of attempts against the life of Emperor Alexander II and finally assassinated him on March 1, 1881, became just such a major crisis, involving almost all of those who implicitly or explicitly claimed to belong to the “society.” Belonging, as follows from the book, means any kind of active response to, any form of participation in, or just readiness to participate in the public sphere. The terrorist crisis of the late nineteenth century mobilized and reinforced precisely that readiness and thus made a potential public sphere visible. Safrono-

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The book by Iuliia Safronova builds on this tendency by interpreting terrorism as a mirror of the modernizing post-reform Russian society. As she explains, when formal institutions are underdeveloped, the population is split into semi-isolated social estates, and individual subjects of the monarchy have neither political representation nor basic freedoms; the society as a whole can be seen only in a state of crisis. The first wave of terrorism, between 1879 and 1881, when the People’s Will terrorist organization staged a number of attempts against the life of Emperor Alexander II and finally assassinated him on March 1, 1881, became just such a major crisis, involving almost all of those who implicitly or explicitly claimed to belong to the “society.” Belonging, as follows from the book, means any kind of active response to, any form of participation in, or just readiness to participate in the public sphere. The terrorist crisis of the late nineteenth century mobilized and reinforced precisely that readiness and thus made a potential public sphere visible. Safronova identifies a great variety of positions and opinions within Russian society and concludes that one cannot approach it as a “really existing ‘organism’” and “a unified agent of action” (332). At the same time, its collective subjectivity was quite real: the utter diversity of members of Russian society notwithstanding, they felt the urge and responsibility to communicate with the state on behalf of
the “society” as custodians of its political and moral welfare (343).

The book offers a comprehensive, multifaceted image of this collective subjectivity, which included all the participants in the public discourse on terrorism and the perceived political and moral crisis: government officials, the Russian Orthodox Church, the liberal, conservative, and underground press (the author argues that often this conventional classification is misleading), nobility assemblies, local societies and provincial administrations, prominent individuals, and anonymous correspondents of the emperor and his ministers. Such an inclusive reading of society is a major innovation of the book, as it contrasts with the still dominant historiographic canon of reducing society to the stratum of radical or “progressive” intelligent-
sia. Safronova argues that all the participants in the fractured public discourse on terrorism claimed the role of representatives of the society. The easy blending of the original nineteenth-century categories with the modern sociological model of “society” often blurs her analysis. Still, Safronova’s all-embracing understanding of society effectively undermines the widespread assumption, prominently articulated by one of the leading students of Russian terrorism, Oleg Budnitskii (“Krov’ po sovesiti”: Terrorizm v Rossi: Dokumenty i biografii [1994]), that the most important documentary sources of the “first wave” of Russian terrorism in the 1870s and 1880s are accessible in published form and well known. Safronova has located many new archival sources, and many of the published sources that she uses have never before appeared in works on Russian terrorism. These become relevant only in light of her approach to terrorism as a “mirror” for the segregated society.

The same richness of sources and approaches, however, requires a better theoretical framework. The book’s introduction consists of two parts that are not connected on a theoretical level: one, positing a historical and constructed nature of “society,” and another, dealing with the historiography of terrorism. The first part of the book examines the problem of terrorism as an “informational field”; the second part looks at how different factions within the “Russian society of 1879–1881” addressed the government with concerns about “terrorism as a prob-
lem.” The division into two parts seems superficial and redundant, mechanically reflecting the author’s metaphor (but not the actual model) of society’s “reflection” in the “mirror” of terrorism. What Safronova’s book really shows is how the terrorism crisis of the nineteenth century created (not reflected) a “political society” and a discourse of politics in which binaries (such as society versus state) and terrorism were key structural elements.

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This book is both modest and ambitious. It is modest because it avoids attention-grabbing claims. It does not, for example, blame Russia for the outbreak of war in 1914. The book is ambitious because it attempts to tell a monumental story at all levels of complexity. Dominic Lieven admits to writing three books in one: from the God’s eye view to the worm’s eye view, with everything in between. From the aerial perspective, he offers a comparative analysis of the trajectories of nation-states and empires from the mid-nineteenth century to the onset of the Great War; from the ground-floor view, he examines the individual figures whose decisions shaped the course of events; in between he surveys the workings of society and public opinion, asserting that even in tsarist Russia state servants did not have an entirely free hand.

Lieven is a leading authority on the imperial character of the Russian old regime: its bureaucracy, aristocracy, court, and monarch. What emerges from the present book, which caps forty years of reflection on the subject, is a rather benign view of the empire’s ruling classes. The last tsar was a problem; clientelism led to corruption, rivalries, and incompetence. Yet, overall these were honorable men pursuing reasonable goals. Their obsession with the Turkish Straits was no more iniquitous or unjustified than the strategic imperatives of other powerful states.

The book’s composite character (God to worm) results in a certain tension, one few historians entirely avoid, whereby structures—broad patterns and interlocking geopolitical, demographic, and historically grounded constraints—confront the decisions and actions of persons and groups and the institutions they control. Unless the “rulers” are thought to enjoy a certain freedom of man-
erve, diplomatic history makes no sense. In Lieven’s words, “The state and its diplomats made foreign policy. Moreover, if underlying structural factors mattered greatly, so too did individuals, events, and sheer chance” (181). Between structure and personality, however, the middle ground—pressures from within and below—gets only a marginal role.

Indeed, Lieven concentrates mainly on the intimate elite who ran the show. He is at his best in presenting the various characters, their training, values, and personal quirks. They are shown to reflect a common culture, the product of schools and breeding, sustained by close family and professional ties. Despite the powerful commonal-
hies, however, they often differed on key issues of state interest and foreign policy. Lieven uses the diplomatic archives to reveal the existence of alternate views even within this fairly homogeneous establishment, showing that the monarchy was not monolithic, yet concluding that certain ways of seeing the world were bound to win out.

Lieven acknowledges that neither the tsar nor his min-
isters operated in a domestic vacuum. Their choices were limited not only by the international balance of power, but also by what he calls “public opinion,” which he equates with the views expressed in newspapers, in the Duma after 1906, and by civilian political leaders. The populace at large does not figure in this equation.

Lieven is of two minds about this “public opinion,” narrow as it is. On the one hand, he suggests that a “conserv-
ative-liberal” consensus united ministers, diplomats, and