Do Mincerian Wage Equations Inform How Schooling Influences Productivity?

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JEL classification: E24, I26, J24

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Do Mincerian Wage Equations Inform How Schooling Influences Productivity?*

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Abstract. We study the links between the Mincerian wage equation (the cross-sectional relationship between wages and years of schooling) and the human capital production function (the causal effect of schooling on labor productivity). Based on a stylized Mincerian general equilibrium model with imperfect substitutability across skill types and ex ante identical workers, we demonstrate that the mechanism of compensating wage differentials renders the Mincerian wage equation uninformative for the human capital production function. Proper identification of the human capital production function should take into account the equilibrium allocation of individuals across skill types.

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1 Introduction

Do cross-sectional wage equations provide evidence on how schooling influences productivity? Several influential authors assume that this is the case. Lucas (1988) motivates his assumption of an exponential relationship between human capital and years of education by pointing to the empirical observation that more educated workers tend to earn higher wages. However, this correlation does not necessarily imply causation, and alternative explanations for wage differences must be considered.

Lucas (1988) argues that more educated workers tend to have higher productivity due to their higher human capital accumulation. This is reflected in their higher wages, but the wage equation does not provide direct evidence on the causal effect of education on productivity. The human capital production function, on the other hand, is the causal relationship between education and productivity, and it is the one that should be estimated to understand the true effect of education on productivity.

In this paper, we explore the relationship between the Mincerian wage equation and the human capital production function. We use a stylized Mincerian general equilibrium model with imperfect substitutability across skill types and ex ante identical workers. We demonstrate that the mechanism of compensating wage differentials renders the Mincerian wage equation uninformative for the human capital production function. Proper identification of the human capital production function should take into account the equilibrium allocation of individuals across skill types.

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of schooling – an exponential human capital production function – with its consistence “with the evidence we have on individual earnings” (p. 19). Bils and Klenow (2000) do the same thing “precisely (...) [to] draw on the large volume of micro evidence” (p. 1162). So do Hall and Jones (1999) who construct their macro-level human capital production function by drawing from a number of country-specific cross-sectional Mincerian return estimates (cf. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Caselli (2005), referring to Hall and Jones (1999), explains this step even more forcefully: “Given our production function, perfect competition in factor and good markets implies that the wage of a worker with \( s \) years of education is proportional to his human capital. Since the wage-schooling relationship is widely thought to be log-linear, this calls for a log-linear relation between \( h \) and \( s \) as well, or something like \( h = \exp(\phi_s s) \), with \( \phi_s \) a constant (...) at country level” (p. 686). The chapter by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) features an entire section titled “Using Mincer Regression Evidence to Estimate Human Capital Stocks”.

The present paper elucidates one important pitfall of this approach and suggests an extension to the standard Mincerian wage regression which allows to avoid it. Namely, when individuals are allowed to endogenously choose the number of years of schooling, \( s \), the standard Mincerian wage equation (the cross-sectional relationship between wages and years of schooling) is insufficient for identifying the underlying human capital production function, and may even fail to convey any useful information in this regard. We present a full dynamic general equilibrium model which exactly exposes the reverse causal link from wages to individuals’ schooling decisions, lying at the heart of the difficulty of identifying the shape of the human capital production function from Mincerian wage equations. While the literature appears to play down the role of this reverse causal link, we show that it can actually be crucial\(^1\) and can be addressed only if the identification of the human capital production function is adequately augmented with the endogenous distribution of skills, as captured by our extended Mincer equation.

Needless to say, there may be multiple ways of modeling the endogenous schooling decision. Let us single out two, perhaps most important, ones. First, it could indeed be that wages are proportional to human capital levels in equilibrium, as assumed in the aforementioned literature. That would be the case, for instance, in models where skill levels are perfectly substitutable. Under this assumption, however, and if furthermore individuals are \( ex \ ante \) identical, then generally a unique equilibrium skill level

\(^1\)Our argumentation expands on the criticism formulated by Jones (2008). The focus of that paper is on how cross-country income differences may arise through strategic complementarities in joint decisions regarding “breadth” and duration of education.
s* is obtained (as in C. Jones, 2007). So there is no skill heterogeneity in the population which could be used for identifying the cross-sectional wage equation. Second, if skill levels are imperfectly substitutable, thus generating demand for varying skill levels in equilibrium (as in B. Jones, 2014), then at least if individuals are ex ante identical, the mechanism of compensating wage differentials (Jovanovic, 1998) will necessarily incorporate skill-specific productivity differences in the equilibrium skill distribution. That will, in turn, imply that wages will be no longer proportional to human capital levels in equilibrium. In fact, in the stylized overlapping generations model presented in this paper, productivity differences are fully accounted for in the skill demand profiles, leaving the cross-sectional wage equation to be identified only by the underlying demographics and retirement pattern. It then carries no information on the human capital production function.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present our model, treating human capital in a life-cycle perspective. Section 3 solves for the equilibrium allocation of skills; a by-product of the analysis is the golden rule of skill formation. Section 4 provides a discussion of our theoretical argument that the cross-sectional relationship between wages and years of schooling may not convey any information on the underlying human capital production function when education decisions are endogenous. In Section 5 a few simple analytical examples are advanced. Section 6 concludes.

2 The model

We consider a closed economy where labor is the only factor of production. Workers are allowed to differ in their skills. The only source of variation in skills is the number of years of schooling s. Labor services provided by workers with different skills are imperfectly substitutable, with a constant elasticity of substitution. Firms employ workers in order to produce the unique final consumption good. They operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Ex ante identical individuals maximize the expected value of their discounted lifetime utility from consumption. With this aim they choose length of their education as in Mincer (1958). Education precludes working but is otherwise cost-free. There is no on-the-job learning. Labor supply by working-age individuals is inelastic. There is exogenous, skill-neutral exponential technological progress at a constant rate g. Time is continuous and flows from $-\infty$ to $+\infty$. People have no bequest motive. Individuals face a known age-specific hazard rate of death at each instant. There is a perfect credit and life annuity market. In equilibrium, wages are going to be
such that individuals are exactly indifferent across various lengths of education (compensating differentials, Jovanovic, 1998). We assume a stationary age structure of the population (Growiec, 2010) and concentrate on the steady-state equilibrium.

**Demographics.** Individuals are born continuously with a fixed birth rate \( b > 0 \). The unconditional probability of survival until age \( t \) is independent of calendar time and given by a function \( m(t) \) such that \( m(0) = 1 \), \( m \) is non-increasing with \( t \), and there is a maximum lifetime, \( T \), such that \( m(t) > 0 \) for \( t \in [0, T) \) and \( m(t) = 0 \) for \( t \geq T \). The survival law \( m(t) \) implies an age-specific hazard rate of death, \(-m'(t)/m(t) \equiv d(t), \) \( 0 < t < T \).

We denote the population size at time \( t \) as \( N(t) \). Then, by the Law of Large Numbers, there are \( P(t, \tau) \equiv bN(t - \tau)m(\tau) \) people aged \( \tau \) in the population at time \( t \). We assume a stationary age structure of the population, signifying that the shares of population at a given age, \( P(t, \tau)/N(t) \), are independent of calendar time \( t \).

Stationarity of the population age structure implies a constant aggregate death rate \( \bar{d} \) which is uniquely determined by the assumed survival law \( m(t) \). The population size at time \( t \) is thus \( N(t) = N(0)e^{nt} \), where \( n \equiv b - \bar{d} \) is the constant population growth rate. Accordingly, \( P(t, \tau)/N(t) = be^{-nt}m(\tau) \). It is found that \( n > 0 \) (respectively, \( n < 0 \)) if the birth rate \( b \) is above (respectively, below) the reciprocal of the life expectancy at birth (see Growiec, 2010; Growiec and Groth, 2015, for derivations).

Under these assumptions the size of a population cohort aged \( \tau \) at time \( t \) (and thus born in the vintage \( v \equiv t - \tau \)) is equal to

\[
P(t, \tau) = bN(0)e^{n(t-\tau)}m(\tau) \equiv e^{n(t-\tau)}m(\tau),
\]

normalizing initial population size at \( N(0) = 1/b \) so that the cohort born at time 0 is of unit size.

A function that will repeatedly appear in the formulas to follow, with different specifications of the parameter \( \alpha \), is the following:

\[
M_\alpha(s) \equiv \int_s^T e^{-\alpha \tau}m(\tau)d\tau, \quad \alpha \in \mathbb{R}, s \in [0, T].
\]

The function \( M_\alpha(s) \) may be interpreted as “expected remaining \( \alpha \)-discounted lifetime” of an individual at age \( s \). The function \( M_\alpha(s) \) takes non-negative values and is differentiable and non-increasing in \( s \). Moreover, if \( \alpha_1 > \alpha_2 \), then \( M_{\alpha_1}(s) \leq M_{\alpha_2}(s) \) and the ratio \( M_{\alpha_1}(s)/M_{\alpha_2}(s) \) is non-increasing in \( s \).

**Time profiles of schooling and work.** We assume that the individuals spend their first \( s \) years of life at school, and then they work full time, providing one unit of labor per
time unit at every age \( \tau \geq s \). There is no retirement. The total expected stream of working time through life provided by an individual with exactly \( s \) years of schooling is then
\[
\int_s^T m(\tau) d\tau \equiv M_0(s).
\]

We denote as \( \pi(s) \) the fraction of any population vintage \( v \) who have decided to obtain exactly \( s \) years of schooling. The maximum demanded skill level (maximum number of years of schooling) is set at \( s > 0 \) where \( M_0(s) > 0 \) so that even among those most educated some manage to do at least some work before they die. By definition, \( \int_0^s \pi(s) ds = 1 \). We assume \( \pi(s) \) to be independent of vintage \( v \) and calendar time \( t \), signifying that we concentrate on a steady-state equilibrium.

Integrating across past vintages \( v \), we find that the measure of workers with exactly \( s \) years of schooling in the population at time \( t \) equals:
\[
Z^t_{s(t)} P(t, t - v) dv = e^{nt} \pi(s) \int_s^T e^{-n\tau} m(\tau) d\tau = e^{nt} \pi(s) M_n(s), \quad s \in [0, \bar{s}]. \tag{3}
\]
Because of our normalization \( bN(0) = 1 \), the factor \( M_n(s) \) can be interpreted as a measure of workers at least \( s \) years old at time 0. Naturally, this measure declines with \( s \). In addition it depends negatively on \( n \) because, looking backward from time 0, the cohorts decline faster the higher is \( n \).

**The human capital production function.** The level of human capital (productive skills) of an individual who has completed \( s \) years of schooling – the *human capital production function* – is denoted as \( h(s) \). We assume that \( h(s) \) takes positive values and is differentiable and increasing in \( s \); it requires no other inputs beyond the individual’s time.

**The firm’s optimization problem.** We assume that firms operate in a competitive environment and face a CES production technology with respect to labor services \( h(s) L_t(s) \), where \( L_t(s) \) measures working hours per time unit at time \( t \) delivered by workers of skill type \( s \). There is also constant exogenous technological progress at a rate \( g \geq 0 \):
\[
Y_t = e^{gt} \left( \int_0^s (h(s)L_t(s))^\theta ds \right)^{1\theta}, \quad 0 < \theta < 1. \tag{4}
\]
The substitutability parameter \( \theta \) determines the elasticity of substitution between skill types as \( \sigma = (1 - \theta)^{-1} \). The case \( 0 < \theta < 1 \) captures the (empirically relevant) case where skill levels are gross substitutes (\( \sigma > 1 \)), so that an increase in the supply of a given skill type increases its competitive income share. The opposite case \( \theta < 0 \) implies that skill types are gross complements.\(^2\)

\(^2\)In the limiting case \( \theta = 0 (\sigma = 1) \), factor shares in income are constant and consequently the CES formula should be replaced with its Cobb-Douglas counterpart, \( Y_t = e^{gt + \int_0^s \ln(h(s)L_t(s)) ds} \).
Focusing on the steady state, we shall use the notations \( L(s) \equiv L_0(s) = e^{-nt}L_\ell(s) \) and \( Y \equiv Y_0 = \left( \int_0^\bar{s} (h(s)L(s))^{\theta} \, ds \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} = e^{-(g+n)t}Y_\ell \) to single out the time-invariant component of skill-specific labor and aggregate output, respectively.

The representative firm chooses its demand for every skill type, \( \{L(s)\}_{s=0}^{\bar{s}} \), in order to maximize its static profit given by:
\[
\Pi_t(\{L(s)\}_{s=0}^{\bar{s}}) = e^{(g+n)t} \left( \int_0^\bar{s} (h(s)L(s))^{\theta} \, ds \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} - e^{nt} \int_0^\bar{s} w_t(s)L(s)ds.
\]
The first-order conditions for labor of different skill types are
\[
e^{gt} Y^{1-\theta} h(s)^{\theta} L(s)^{\theta-1} = w_t(s) = w(s)e^{it}, \quad s \in [0,\bar{s}],
\] where \( w(s) \equiv w_0(s) \) is the time-invariant component of the wage rate. Given that (5) can be written as \( w(s)L(s) = Y^{1-\theta} (h(s)L(s))^{\theta} \), we have
\[
\int_0^\bar{s} w(s)L(s)ds = Y^{1-\theta} \int_0^\bar{s} (h(s)L(s))^{\theta} = Y.
\]
So, in accordance with constant returns to scale, the firm’s total production cost will equal output and profits will be zero in equilibrium.

By (3), clearing in the labor markets amounts to
\[
L(s) = \pi(s) M_n(s), \quad s \in [0,\bar{s}]. \tag{7}
\]

**The individual’s optimization problem.** We assume that every individual born at time \( \nu \), subject to the usual budget constraint, maximizes her expected lifetime utility from consumption and with this aim optimally chooses her number of years of schooling. As mentioned, there is a perfect credit and life annuity market. People have no bequest motive. Hence they are born with zero net financial assets and early in life they take life-insured loans to finance consumption while at school. Apart from the uncertain lifetime, there is no uncertainty. At birth individuals are alike.

The problem at hand admits the “separation theorem” (Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 10), thanks to which we may first solve for the optimal number of years of schooling and then turn to the consumption decision.

**The schooling decision.** An individual born at time \( \nu \) chooses the length of education \( s \) in order to maximize human wealth – discounted expected lifetime earnings – as seen from time \( \nu \) (Mincer, 1958; Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2003):
\[
HW(\nu, s) = \int_{\nu+s}^T w_t(s)e^{-r(t-s)}m(t-\nu)\,dt = e^{\nu t}w(s) \int_s^T e^{-(r-s)\tau}m(\tau)\,d\tau = e^{\nu t}w(s)M_{r-g}(s),
\]
where $r$ is the risk-free interest rate, perceived by the individual as exogenous. Subject to subsequent confirmation, we tentatively consider the rate $r$ as constant over time. The time-invariant component, $w(s)$, of the skill-specific wage rate can be taken in front of the integral because it does not depend on the individual’s age $\tau$ (no on-the-job learning). This also implies that once an individual enters the workforce, she will receive exponentially growing flows of earnings. Thus we rule out the usual hump-shaped age-earnings profiles (Ben-Porath, 1967).

Solving the individual’s optimization problem regarding schooling yields the following first-order condition:

$$w'(s)Mr_{-s}(s) = -w(s)Mr'_{-s}(s).$$

(9)

This condition equates the marginal benefit of one more year of schooling to the marginal opportunity cost in terms of earnings forgone by entering the labor market one year later.

From the firm’s first-order condition (5) it follows that there will be positive demand for labor of every skill level $s \in [0, \bar{s}]$. To be willing to supply any of these different skill levels, the ex ante identical individuals must be exactly indifferent when choosing length of education $s$. Hence the individuals’ first-order condition (9) must hold for all $s \in [0, \bar{s}]$. So (9) makes up a linear differential equation for $w$ as a function of $s$. The solution is

$$w(s) = w(0)e^{-\int_0^s \frac{Mr_{-s}(x)}{Mr_{-s}(s)} dx} = w(0)\frac{Mr_{-s}(0)}{Mr_{-s}(s)}, \quad s \in [0, \bar{s}].$$

(10)

In equilibrium, human wealth, $HW(v, s)$ in (8), is therefore the same for any $s \in [0, \bar{s}]$. The intuition behind the second equality in (10) is that according to (9), the augmentation rate of the wage rate with respect to schooling is the same as the rate of decline with respect to schooling of the expected stream of discounted working time through life. Hence, the augmentation factor of the wage rate with respect to schooling when comparing 0 to $s$ years of schooling – the compensating wage differential – equals the corresponding decay factor of the expected stream of discounted working time through life.

**The consumption-saving decision.** Having made her optimal schooling decision, the individual of vintage $v$ with planned schooling level $s$ maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility from consumption (we assume CRRA utility):

$$\max_{\{c(v, t)\}_{t=v}^{v+T}} \int_v^{v+T} c(v, t)^{1-\eta} \frac{1}{1-\eta} e^{-\rho(t-v)} m(t-v) dt, \quad \eta > 0, \rho \geq 0,$$
subject to the dynamic budget constraint:

\[ \dot{a}(v, s, t) = (r + d(t - v))a(v, s, t) + \bar{w}_t(s) - c(v, t), \quad a(v, s, v) = 0, \]  

(11)

where \( a(v, s, t) \) is net assets held at time \( t \). We use the notation \( \bar{w}_t(s) = w_t(s) \) if \( t - v > s \) (so that the individual is in her working age) and \( \bar{w}_t(s) = 0 \) otherwise (when the individual is still at school). In (11) the term \( d(t - v)a(v, s, t) \) captures the life insurance part of annuity payments (or annuity receipts if the individual has positive \( a(v, s, t) \)) covering the hazard rate of death. So \( r + d(t - v) \) is the “actuarial interest rate” at age \( t - v \). When the individual dies, the obligation or the entitlement is canceled. Upon birth, the individual holds no assets. Subject to subsequent confirmation, we tentatively consider the consumption path of any individual of vintage \( v \) to be independent of the chosen \( s \).

The individual also faces the solvency condition implying that, in expected value, accumulated discounted primary saving at death is nonnegative:

\[ \int_{v}^{v+T} (\bar{w}_t(s) - c(v, t))e^{-r(t-v)}m(t - v)dt \geq 0. \]  

(12)

Equation (12) is required to hold only in expected value thanks to the assumption of a perfect life annuity market (Yaari, 1965, p. 147-148).

Solving for the optimal path of consumption yields the Keynes-Ramsey rule:

\[ \frac{\dot{c}(v,t)}{c(v,t)} = \frac{r - \rho}{\eta} \equiv \gamma(r). \]  

(13)

Individual consumption will be either growing, constant, or declining across the individual’s lifetime, depending on the relation between \( r \) and the rate of time preference, \( \rho \geq 0 \). Solving for \( c(v,t) \) yields:

\[ c(v,t) = c(v,v)e^{\gamma(r)(t-v)} = e^{r v}c_0 e^{\gamma(r)(t-v)}, \]  

(14)

where \( c_0 \equiv c(0,0) \) and we have imposed that in steady state \( c(v,v) = e^{rv}c_0 \), to be confirmed subsequently.

Integrating the asset equation (11) over time \( t \), we find\(^3\) that net asset holdings at

\[^3\text{Recall that since } d(\tau) \equiv -m'(\tau)/m(\tau), \text{and } m(0) = 1, \text{ then } m(t - v) = \exp(-\int_{v}^{t} d(u - v)du). \]
time $t$ of an individual of vintage $v$, having decided schooling level $s$, are equal to

$$
a(v, s, t) = \begin{cases} \\
\frac{e^{r(t-v)}}{m(t-v)} e^{\theta v} c_0 \int_0^{t-v} e^{-(r-\gamma(r))\tau} m(\tau) d\tau, & \text{if } t \in [v, v+s], \\
\frac{e^{r(t-v)}}{m(t-v)} e^{\theta v} \left( w(s) \int_s^{t-v} e^{-(r-\gamma(r))\tau} m(\tau) d\tau \\
- c_0 \int_0^{t-v} e^{-(r-\gamma(r))\tau} m(\tau) d\tau \right), & \text{if } t \in (v+s, v+T).
\end{cases}
$$

It remains to determine the exact value for $c_0$ via the necessary transversality condition that the solvency condition (12) holds with strict equality:

$$
\int_v^{v+T} (\tilde{w}(s) - c(v, t)) e^{-(r(t-v))} m(t-v) dt = e^{\theta v} \left( w(s) \int_s^{T} e^{-(r-\gamma(r))\tau} m(\tau) d\tau \\
- c_0 \int_0^{T} e^{-(r-\gamma(r))\tau} m(\tau) d\tau \right) = e^{\theta v} \left( w(s) M_{r-\gamma}(s) \right)
$$

using the definition of the function $M_{\delta}(s)$ in (2). Thus

$$
c_0 = w(s) M_{r-\gamma}(s) / M_{r-\gamma}(0) = w(0) M_{r-\gamma}(0) / M_{r-\gamma}(0), \quad (15)
$$

where the latter equality is implied by (10). It is hereby confirmed that the consumption path of any individual of vintage $v$ is independent of the chosen $s$.

### 3 Intertemporal equilibrium

**Clearing in the market for loanable funds.** The “life-cycle” of net assets is such that early in life the individual borrows to finance her consumption while at school. She then joins the workforce, which allows her to gradually repay the initial debt and on average accumulate positive net wealth.

The only store of value is loans. Aggregate financial wealth, $A(t)$, is thus zero for all $t$:

$$
A(t) = \int_0^t \left( \int_{t-s}^{t-s+s} a(v, s, t) \pi(s) P(t, t-v) dv \right) ds = 0.
$$

Hence, also aggregate saving, $S(t)$, is nil for all $t$:

$$
\dot{A}(t) = S(t) = \int_0^t w(t) L(t) ds - C(t) = 0, \quad (16)
$$
where \( C(t) = \int_{t-	au}^{t} c(v, t)P(t, t-v)dv \) is aggregate consumption. Concentrating on \( t = 0 \), we obtain the following equation for the interest rate \( r \) in equilibrium:

\[
C(0) = c_0 \int_0^T e^{-(g+n-r)} \tau m(\tau)d\tau = c_0 M_{g+n-r}(0) \frac{M_{g+n-r}(0)}{M_{g+n-r}(0)}
\]

\[
= \int_0^\infty w(s) \pi(s) M_n(s)ds = w(0)M_{g+n-r}(0) \int_0^\infty \pi(s) \frac{M_n(s)}{M_{g+n-r}(s)}ds,
\]  

where we have first applied (14) and (1), then the definition of \( M \), then the transversality condition, then (16) combined with clearing in the labor market, i.e., (7), and finally the compensating wage differential in (10). Equating the last term in the first line to that in the second gives \( r = g + n \), in view of the identity \( \int_0^\infty \pi(s)ds = 1 \).

In this way we have confirmed that \( r \) is constant over time. More importantly, we find that the equilibrium interest rate \( r \) equals the steady-state growth rate of final output, \( g + n \). The interest rate matters, through the Keynes-Ramsey rule (13), for growth of individual consumption, and through the transversality condition it matters for the individual’s level of consumption, cf. (15). The equality \( r - g = n \) ensures that the initial consumption level is the same for all skill types and remains consistent with clearing in the output market, cf. (17).

Note that the equilibrium interest rate is thus independent of the individuals’ preference parameters \( \rho \) and \( \eta \). This is because we have for simplicity ignored physical capital. In the absence of physical capital accumulation, there is no trade-off between less consumption now, i.e., more capital accumulation now, and higher consumption in the future. Instead, the interest rate is free to adjust to the golden rule level, \( g + n \). This level of the interest rate takes into account that (i) each consecutive generation has higher consumption than the previous one due to exogenous technological progress (presupposing \( g > 0 \)), and (ii) each consecutive generation is also more populous than the previous one (if \( n > 0 \)). At the same time it turns out that this interest rate ensures the highest technically feasible steady-state level of trend-corrected per capita consumption, see below. Thus, also in our present context of human capital accumulation is the name golden rule interest rate justified for the interest rate \( r = g + n \).

**Equilibrium skill distribution and wage structure.** To prepare the ground for the main result, we shall determine the distribution of skills and the resulting wage structure in a steady-state equilibrium. In the next section we then conclude that thanks to the mechanism of compensating wage differentials, the wage distribution in a steady-state equilibrium is independent of the human capital production function \( h(s) \).

\[4\text{Generically, this is the unique solution.}\]
As noted in (6), the firm’s total production cost equals output. With clearing in the labor markets this implies
\[ \int_0^{\bar{s}} w(s) \pi(s) M_n(s) ds = Y. \]
Plugging (10) into this and substituting \( r = g + n \) gives
\[ w(s) M_n(s) = w(0) M_n(0) = Y \text{ for all } s \in [0, \bar{s}], \quad (18) \]

since \( \int_0^{\bar{s}} \pi(s) ds = 1 \). That is, because \( r = g + n \) in equilibrium, the mechanism of compensating wage differentials equalizes the total input cost of each skill type, making it proportional to total cost (i.e., total output at time 0, \( Y \)). The factor of proportionality is one because we have normalized cohort 0 to be of size one, \( bN(0) = 1 \). Note that the human capital production function \( h(s) \) does not enter (18).

From clearing in the market for labor of skill type \( s \), together with the firm’s first-order condition (5), we get
\[ \pi(s) M_n(s) = L(s) = Y w(s)^{-\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} h(s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} = Y^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} M_n(s)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}} h(s)^{\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}}, \]
where the last equality comes from inserting (18). It follows that
\[ \pi(s) = Y^{-\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} (h(s) M_n(s))^{\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}}. \quad (19) \]

This leads to the final solution for the time-invariant component of output, the distribution of skills, and the wage structure in a steady-state equilibrium. Integrating over \( s \) in (19) and solving for equilibrium output at time 0 yields
\[ Y = \left( \int_0^{\bar{s}} (h(s) M_n(s))^{\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} ds \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\sigma}}. \quad (20) \]

Plugging this into (19) gives the equilibrium distribution of skills as
\[ \pi(s) = \left( \int_0^{\bar{s}} (h(s) M_n(s))^{\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} ds \right)^{-1} (h(s) M_n(s))^{\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}}, \text{ for all } s \in [0, \bar{s}]. \quad (21) \]

Finally, plugging (20) into (18) gives the equilibrium wage structure:
\[ w(s) = \frac{Y}{M_n(s)} = \frac{1}{M_n(s)} \left( \int_0^{\bar{s}} (h(s) M_n(s))^{\frac{\theta}{1-\sigma}} ds \right)^{\frac{1-\theta}{\sigma}}, \text{ for all } s \in [0, \bar{s}]. \quad (22) \]

**The golden rule of skill formation.** To demonstrate that the above equilibrium allocation is consistent with the golden rule, consider a social planner solving the following problem: among all technically feasible steady-state paths, choose the one maximizing the trend-corrected level of consumption \( e^{-(s+n)t} C(t) = C(0) \). The social planner
will choose the same $\pi(s)$ as that given in (21), which results in $C(0) = Y$ as given in (20). Hence, the skill distribution, $\pi(s)$, obtained in a steady-state equilibrium of our competitive economy without externalities and without capital accumulation complies with the golden rule of skill formation: the skill profile required to obtain the highest situated sustainable path of per capita consumption is obtained when the interest rate equals $g + n$, the golden rule interest rate.

4 Can the human capital production function be identified from the Mincerian wage equation?

We are now ready to answer the main question: do cross-sectional Mincerian wage equations inform how schooling influences productivity? Our answer is no, or at least not when the distribution of skills arises endogenously, driven by compensating wage differentials.

To see this in our model, we take logs of both sides of equation (22):

$$\ln w(s) = \ln Y - \ln M_n(s). \quad (23)$$

Hence, in equilibrium, the cross-sectional wage regression equation cannot be used for inferring the human capital production function $h(s)$. If individuals are ex ante identical, then what the Mincerian wage regression actually captures is not skill-specific productivities, $h(s)$, but measures of people at least $s$ years old, for $s = s_1, s_2, \ldots$, and still in the labor force. Due to the presence of compensating wage differentials, the skill-specific productivities are fully incorporated in the equilibrium skill allocation (21), leaving the wage equation to be identified only by the underlying demographics (and retirement pattern in an extended model), but not the human capital production function.

It is also instructive to isolate $h(s)$ in equation (21), take logs, and use (23) to get

$$\ln h(s) = \ln w(s) + \left(1 - \frac{\theta}{\theta}\right) \ln \pi(s). \quad (24)$$

We may call this the extended Mincer equation. Furthermore, this equation may, in view of clearing in the labor markets, $\pi(s)M_n(s) = L(s)$, be also given an alternative formulation:

$$\ln h(s) = \left(\frac{1}{\theta}\right) \ln w(s) + \left(1 - \frac{\theta}{\theta}\right) \ln \frac{L(s)}{Y}. \quad (25)$$

5 The proof, using $\pi(s)$ as control variable over the interval $[0, \bar{s}]$, is available from the authors upon request.

6 The model is easily generalized to the case of age-dependent labor supply with exponential retirement where labor supply of individuals aged $\tau$ equals $\ell(\tau) = e^{-\mu \tau}$, $\mu > 0$. 

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These two last expressions for \( \ln h(s) \) imply that if one wants to identify the shape of the human capital production function from a cross-sectional wage regression equation, then one should also account for the information conveyed by either the equilibrium skill distribution within each cohort, \( \pi(s) \), or the equilibrium skill distribution in the cross-section of the labor force, represented by \( L(s)/Y \).

A few observations are due here. First, the extra term in equation (23) is constant, thus reducing the extended Mincer equation to its standard form, only if \( h(s) \propto (M_n(s))^{-1} \). In other words, the human capital production function \( h(s) \) can be identified with the cross-sectional wage distribution \( w(s) \) only if they both happen to be inversely proportional to the demographic profile of the population, summarized by \( M_n(s) \).

Second, under endogeneity of the schooling decision the curvature of the human capital production function \( h(s) \) is related to the skewness of the endogenous skill distribution \( \pi(s) \). If relatively more individuals within a cohort choose high skill levels, so that \( \pi(s) \) is increasing in \( s \), then \( h(s) \) increases more sharply than \( w(s) \) – and the other way round if relatively more individuals choose low skill levels. In future research, one may want to reconcile this finding with the mounting empirical evidence that Mincerian rates of return tend to fall with \( s \) (Hall and Jones, 1999; Bils and Klenow, 2000; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004).

Third, in the limiting case of perfect substitutability across skill levels, i.e., the case \( \theta = 1 \), with competitive firms maximizing their static profits and \textit{ex ante} identical workers, one directly obtains from (5) \( w(s) = h(s) \). That is, for two different educational levels, \( s_1 \) and \( s_2 \), to be supplied in equilibrium, in view of (10), \( h(s_2)/h(s_1) \) must be exactly equal to the required compensating wage differential \( M_{r-g}(s_1)/M_{r-g}(s_2) \). Given that we have not imposed any functional restrictions on \( h \), apart from \( h' > 0 \), this would be an unlikely coincidence. Hence, the schooling first-order condition (9), with \( w \) replaced by \( h \), generally has at most one solution, \( s^* \) (Jones, 2007). So there will generally be no skill heterogeneity in the population, necessary for identifying the Mincerian wage equation. Hence, the equality \( w(s) = h(s) \) alone does not justify the use of the Mincerian cross-sectional wage equation as an indirect human capital production function representation.

5 Analytical examples

Two analytical examples will illustrate our main point: that in a model where equilibrium skill heterogeneity accrues thanks to compensating wage differentials, the cross-
sectional wage equation carries no information useful for inferring the shape of the human capital production function. This is so even if the cross-sectional wage equation is well approximated by the famous log-linear Mincerian form.

**Fixed lifetimes.** This is the case $m(t) = 1$ for $t < T$ and $m(t) = 0$ for $t \geq T$. So here individuals’ lifespans are deterministically equal to $T$. If $n \neq 0$, then $M_n(s) = (e^{-ns} - e^{-nT})/n$ and $M'_n(s)/M_n(s) = -n/(1 - \exp(-n(T-s)))$. Under this survival law, the cross-sectional wage equation (23) becomes:

$$\ln w(s) = \text{const} - \ln \left( e^{-ns} - e^{-nT} \right) \approx \text{new const} + ns,$$

where the last approximation assumes that $T$ is “large” and thus the aggregate death rate $\bar{d}$ is “small” (Heckman, Lochner, and Todd, 2003).\(^7\)

If $n = 0$, however, $M_n(s)$ becomes $M_0(s) = T - s$, with $M'_0(s)/M_0(s) = -1/(T - s)$, and (26) is replaced by

$$\ln w(s) = \text{const} - \ln(T - s).$$

**The “perpetual youth” survival law, Blanchard (1985).** This is the case $m(t) = e^{-\bar{d}t}$. Lifetime is uncertain but has no upper bound. Our above results are easily generalized to this case. Allowing $T = \infty$ in the definition of $M_n(s)$ in (2), we get, under this survival law, in view of $n = b - \bar{d}$, that $M_n(s) = e^{-(n+\bar{d})s}/(n + \bar{d}) = e^{-bs}/b$ and $M'_n(s)/M_n(s) = b$. Note that also in this case is $M_n(s)$ finite.

The cross-sectional wage equation (23) becomes:

$$\ln w(s) = \text{const} + bs,$$

which is the exact Mincerian (log-linear) specification. It does not reflect the economy’s human capital production function, however, which essentially can be any increasing function $h(s)$. The relationship (27) only reflects the underlying demographics.

In both cases, the approximate Mincerian (log-linear) relationships obtained do not reflect the human capital production function but only how the demographics shape the wage profile.

### 6 Conclusion

Do cross-sectional wage equations inform how schooling influences productivity? Several influential authors have been assuming that it is the case. We have, however, presented a theoretical argument that such claims should be treated with caution due to

\(^7\)This may be a rather bad approximation, however, as it requires $n \approx b$. In modern days, most advanced economies tend to have $n \approx 0$, with $b \approx \bar{d}$. 

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the endogeneity of schooling decisions. Our simple Mincerian model highlights the role of compensating wage differentials in shaping these decisions. And when skill-specific productivity differentials are fully incorporated in the demand function for skills, then the cross-sectional Mincerian wage equation does not carry any information on the human capital production function.

Our model is highly stylized, though. One could imagine an economy where the cross-sectional wage equation conveys at least some information on the human capital production technology. This could obtain, for example, because of heterogeneity in workers’ innate abilities, credit market frictions limiting individuals’ education choices, or technological change that gives rise to continued change in the educational composition of the labor force. While working these cases out is left for further research, it can still be generally concluded that when identifying the shape of the human capital production function from cross-sectional wage regressions, it is advised not to omit the information conveyed by the equilibrium skill allocation. Typically, this allocation has been taken as exogenous in the associated literature, though.

Bibliography


