On May, 15, 2015, the EUSP’s Department of Political Science and Sociology held its traditional annual conference. This year, department professors and guests led three roundtable discussions.
1. Empirical Sociology and Authoritarianism Participants: Elena Zdravomyslova, Grigory Yudin, Kirill Titaev, Artemy Magun, Ilya Matveev
Sociology as a discipline blossomed in liberal-democratic societies; however, it received a special significance within authoritarian regimes. One of the best manifestations of sociology’s impact in authoritarian societies came in the form of mass surveys. The role of these in legitimizing the regime as well as in ensuring feedback between the population and elite interests is still not fully clear. The roundtable discussion was dedicated to the following questions: what is the sociology’s role in an authoritarian society? Can sociologists combine research goals with political demands or other specific means for legitimizing their discipline before the authorities? What was the experience of sociology in the Soviet Union?
Elena Zdravomyslova began the discussion, talking about her own perceptions of Soviet sociology. Soviet sociology existed under the pressure of censorship and unpredictable repression, and fulfilled governmental demands in order to blend into the state matrix and ensure some sort of existence for itself. It turns out, however, that sociology had many survival strategies within the Soviet Union. Gennady Batygin defines three types of Soviet sociologists based on breeds of dogs: hunting, guard, and toy. “Guard” sociologists fulfilled a servile function in relation to the state; “hunting” sociologists “hunted” for knowledge, trying to act in accordance with unbiased sociology; “toy” sociologists carried out communicative functions.
Grigory Yudin gave a short but compelling lecture on public opinion surveys. In modern Russia such surveys created a public image of sociology; sociologists have repudiated this image. Public opinion surveys spread in Russia during perestroika as a result of democratization. One of Russia’s initial pollsters was Boris Grushin, who had dreamed of this for years. In that time the role of sociology seemed obvious: it should be the mirror of society. However, this concept is not as innocuous as it first appears. After all, such a seemingly democratic institution as the sociological survey, invented in 1936 by George Gallup, lends legitimacy to undemocratic regimes. The history of the emergence and development of pollsters looks very intriguing in this regard.
In 1936 Gallup believed that accurate mass surveys could fulfill two functions: the democratic mission of government and the mission of objective scientific knowledge. This notion of democratic representation achieved by objective scientific means fascinated Soviet sociologists during perestroika. But the very idea, has turned out to be utopian. Indeed, it’s much more complicated: Gallup’s surveys were absorbed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the future founder of Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Polling who collaborated with the Nazis. In 1940 she defended the dissertation on the study of opinion in the United States, where she defined her understanding of the role of mass surveys. In Noelle-Neumann’s view, society should be led, and mass surveys could ensure a link between the leaders and those who are led.
In this way, the link between mass surveys and democracy played out as a bad joke to its adherents. The problem lies in the idea of total representation. Here it’s important to bear in mind a critique of representation laid out by Ernesto Laclau: representation always changes that which it tries to represent, creating its own referent. Representation suppresses that which it does not represent. It creates a hegemony, suppressing competing representations. It always represents only that which wants to be represented: certain societal groups and the people within them that respond to calls for representation. In this perspective, it’s interesting to note the remarks of Russian politicians about decisions made on the basis of secret mass surveys — Russian citizens appear as the subject of Russia’s aggressive foreign policy.
Furthermore, experiments in which interviewers were questioned showed that approximately one third of respondents didn’t tell the truth out of fear. The interviewer can also be used to transfer complaints to higher authorities. In this way, non-symmetrical dialogue creates communication problems between respondents and interviewers.
Kirill Titaev continued to elaborate on this subject: the history of Soviet sociology is, first and foremost, the history of interaction with the state. Its main product is that which can influence government decisions. During perestroika Soviet sociologists continued to work on power structures since democratization was initiated from above, and centers for studying public opinion were formed. If we combine statistical data on mass surveys published on the websites of federal and regional ministers (a single survey ostensibly involves thirty-forty thousand people), it turns out that every citizen of the Russian federation participates in such surveys six times per year. This, naturally, doesn’t happen, a fact of which both scholars and officials are well aware. Local authorities constantly report on the conducted mass surveys: they do this because democratic representation of the population is missing, trying to find support in the decision-making process. The researcher believes that sociology in Russia is impossible without interacting with the authorities.
2. Authoritarianism, Totalitarianism, Bonapartism, Fascism. Artemy Magun, Ilya Matveev, Ilya Budraitskis, Mikhail Piskunov
Artemy Magun believes that the term “authoritarianism” was first used, in the sense that we know it, by Juan Linz. Linz borrowed the term from the Frankfurt School, modifying the term “authoritarian personality.” The term arose from the word “authority,” which implies an informal moral authority alongside the formal. This term calls for dichotomy: either a lack of authority and mistrust of power or authoritarianism—the rule of authority. It is problematic especially since an authoritarian regime can base itself on a non-authoritative ruler. Another term for this same phenomenon is dictatorship. But its usage is also not entirely correct: the term “dictatorship” comes from the Roman word signifying a democratic ruler nominated by the Senate for the role of dictator, with large amounts of authority. At the basis of the term lies a republican idea; the term is associated with a state of emergency analogous to a commissarian regime. In Russia we observe neither one nor the other. There is a particular historical plume behind the terms used to describe the Russian regime and other rigidly vertical regimes with corruption in the private sphere, so scholars need to develop or rediscover another concept.
Ilya Matveev describes the Russian regime as neo-patrimonial, in which the borders between private and public spheres are blurred, and the bureaucracy doesn’t work as an impersonal structure. Governmental posts are distributed on the basis of personal and family ties. The economic and political spheres are joined in one and the same personalities, and power and property are united in the same hands. But we shouldn’t consider the Russian regime as neo-patrimonial, since the latter assumes a traditional type of legitimacy that does not correspond to Russian reality. In general, Russia presents itself as a hybrid, and a puzzle to researchers. On the one hand, the existence of a number of traits prevents us from calling the Russian regime (neo)patrimonial: elections have the characteristics of a plebiscite, the president’s legitimacy isn’t based on tradition; political regime resembles Bonapartism in terms of its support (the majority supporting Putin represents itself not as a class, but as atomized individuals); and a simulation of the Putin majority’s active role occurs through elections and mass surveys on which the regime’s legitimacy is based.
Ilya Budraitskis spoke about how the media often describes the Russian regime as fascist, but why it cannot be such for a variety of reasons. Fascism arose as a result of certain historical and social factors that do not currently exist in Russia.
Mikhail Piskunov spoke about post-Soviet capitalism in Russia, which he calls market Bolshevism. This form of capitalism arose as the result of economic and political reforms in Russia. Property and power belong to insiders who control economic flows and profit from them. As the executive power the state is not a mediator for various social forces; officials are open to radical neo-liberal ideas that encounter societal resistance.
3. Feminism: Theory and Practice within Conditions of the Conservative Turn Anna Temkina, Elena Zdravomyslova, Maria Godovannaya, Nadezhda Nartova
Under conditions of the so-called conservative turn and neo-traditional ideology, politics intervenes in private life and practices related to the organization of intimate life and raising children. Gender theory is an important tool for understanding relations between the government and citizens. The goal of this roundtable was to unite gender studies and feminist practice to get a better sense of what is happening.
Anna Temkina spoke of how Russian conservatism has influenced gender issues and given them a negative spin. The Law on Gender equality was not adopted, as it was declared a threat to traditional family values. In public discourse gender is associated with the destruction of the family and of society. A new context for the slogan “the personal is political” has arisen, in which the “political” is understood as political activity, and such groups and organizations have been given the status of foreign agents. Thus activists have chosen an outsider’s position in relationship to the political; social and cultural projects along with feminist initiatives can exist only for a small audience.
Maria Godovannaya spoke about the initiatives of feminist artists, female artists and art activists such as Women’s Day, Media Udar [Media Impact], the Feminist Pencil, the Women’s Historical Night, the Feminist Kitchen, the “Intimate Place” Laboratory, and others. She said that it’s difficult for those involved to find solidarity, which reduces the possibility of joint action for feminist activists.
Elena Zdravomyslova summed up the roundtable, outlining the context of Russia’s conservative turn. The conservative turn in gender politics began in the 2000s, when the idea of normative femininity and relations legal began to enter the public discourse. These narratives created an effect that contributes to the formation of the majority of Putin’s supporters.
Sofya Lopatina
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